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1. Executive summary 
1.1 Background 
Renewable energy sources for electricity generation (RES-E) and other distributed generation (DG) 
technologies, such as local combined heat and power (CHP) power plants, are among the core elements 
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Besides, they help achieving other EU policy targets such as 
security of supply. With an increasing penetration, the focus shifts from direct support schemes to 
efficient market integration. Incentives should support flexibility based on market price signals in the 
short term, and long term distortion of markets should be minimised. Locational signals for DG/RES 
investments should include interaction with distribution and transmission grids. Regulation of network 
companies and support schemes should be coordinated to secure that incentives for efficient integration 
exist. One of the key issues is the interaction with distribution system operators (DSOs), which 
constitutes the physical connection between a DG/RES unit and the remaining power system. The 
design of support schemes and national distribution network regulation is to the discretion of the 
individual EU Member States. This report analyses the economic factors of DG/RES and DSO 
operations with a focus on their interactions. Both points of view are confronted with each other to 
derive regulatory implications for the single aspects of their interaction. Based on the relevant 
regulation affecting DG operators’ and DSOs’ operations in different countries, existing grid codes and 
the changes to these rules that have been proposed, we aim to identify which rules could be 
implemented in order to provide DSOs with the right incentives to facilitate and pass on incentives to 
DG to install capacity and integrate operation of DG/RES in a way that increases total efficiency. 
Different possibilities for designing the regulation of the DG producers’ and DSOs’ operations in a way 
that increases the incentives for these entities to integrate DG/RES in the electricity system have been 
analysed. In the following, the influence of network regulation and application of support schemes on 
cost and revenue streams of DG operators and DSOs are illustrated by means of a simple analytical 
modelling approach. Subsequently, some light will be shed on the qualitative implications of market 
interactions and market power. 
This report constitutes Deliverable D3 of the dissemination activities of Work Package 2 of the 
IMPROGRES project, dealing with current DG/RES, DSO and market interactions. The D3 
Deliverable discusses the interactions between the aforementioned entities and illustrates them with 
five cases: West Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
1.2 Approach and structure  
In order to deal with the aforementioned questions, this report consists of the following parts: 
1. A detailed analysis of DSO and DG/RES economics with focus on the relation to the 
respectively other party. 
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This section is divided in several subsections, each of them corresponding to one of the several 
aspects of the interaction between DSOs and DG/RES. Specifically, the topics that are dealt 
with include the level of integration between them, network regulation, remuneration of 
DG/RES, the participation of DG/RES in power markets and the provision of ancillary services. 
Moreover, the allocation of costs arising from DG/RES integration, the planning of grid 
expansion, the impact of DG on the quality of service, as well as the incentives for DSOs to 
introduce innovations are addressed. Within each of the aforementioned sections, first a 
conceptual analysis of the potential impacts (both positive and negative) that the corresponding 
regulation may have on the incentives for DSOs to integrate DG/RES generation is provided. 
Afterwards, the existing regulation in place in the focus countries is discussed. Finally, 
regulatory implications are highlighted. 
2. A revenue stream model 
This section describes a simple model to analyse the impact on DG revenue of allowing DG to 
participate in both day ahead and regulating markets under different support schemes. A second 
line of analyses deals with the incentive interactions with the DSO from network losses and 
connection charges with the help of another simple model.  
3. Economic impacts of DG/RES integration on power markets 
This part addresses several topics as the integration into spot and regulating markets and the 
impact on market power in a predominantly qualitative manner. 
1.3 Main findings 
Integration of DG/RES and DSO operations 
Vertical integration between network operators, in particular DSOs, and DG/RES generation influences 
the incentives of market actors in different directions. The level of integration between DSOs and 
DG/RES generation is subject to the unbundling requirements by the EU. Four levels of unbundling 
can be distinguished: ownership unbundling, legal unbundling, functional unbundling, and unbundling 
of accounts. Legal and functional unbundling are mandatory for all DSOs, but Member States can 
apply an exception rule for small DSOs. Regulation on provisions governing the unbundling of DSOs 
has to balance the danger of a vertically integrated DSO exercising local market power (e.g., 
aggravation of network access for competitors in a rural network) against the financial and operational 
burden unbundling imposes on small DSOs that have to sustain against large-scale generators in the 
European electricity market. 
Network regulation 
The regulation and level of network charges are pivotal for the access conditions of DG/RES 
generators; this applies in particular to third party access for generators not owning and operating 
networks themselves. Network charges can be differentiated with respect to connection charges to be 
paid for obtaining the initial connection to the network, and the network tariff. 
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Connection charges can be separated according to DG/RES cost participation: for shallow charges, they 
pay only the direct cost of connection, whereas they pay all linked network upgrade costs at the 
distribution and transmission level under deep connection charges. Shallowish charges are an 
intermediate. Use-of-System charges (UoS) are variable and applied per transmitted kilowatt-hour. 
However, charging methodologies and target groups (consumers only or consumers and generators) 
depend on national legislation. The income of TSOs and DSOs consists of the sum of all network 
charges and tariffs and can itself be subject to an overall cap to incentivise the DSO towards more 
economical operations. Results of the project expert survey show that a multitude of different network 
regulation approaches – economic network regulation as well as connection and use-of-system charges 
– are followed in practice. Shallow connection charges with no generator UoS charges are optimal to 
foster a fast growth of DG/RES units, but neglect DSO system integration aspects. 
Remuneration of DG/RES 
The operation of most DG/RES units is not yet economically viable under market conditions. Member 
States support these technologies therefore, but with different support schemes. In contrast to 
investment support, which is mainly granted for technologies which are distant from market 
integration, operating support is the dominant instrument for more mature technologies. These are 
subdivided into quantity-based schemes (where the regulator defines a target of a renewable generation 
quota that needs to be met) and price-based schemes. The latter one can be implemented as a feed-in 
tariff where the regulator guarantees a certain income for every generated kilowatt-hour (kWh), or as a 
price premium scheme. In the latter case, a premium on top of market prices is granted. The 
predominant support scheme in Germany is the feed-in tariff, whereas Denmark and the Netherlands 
apply price premiums and Spain a combination of feed-in tariffs and premiums. In the UK, a system of 
green certificates is in place whereby generation companies are forced to produce a certain fraction of 
their total output from renewable energy sources. RES generators’ revenues result from the sale of their 
green certificates on top of actual power sales. The DSO is not directly affected by the choice of 
support scheme, only by indirect effects as resulting local DG/RES penetration growth. Production or 
generation based support schemes will concentrate DG/RES development in the most favourable 
generation areas whereas more differentiated support schemes or investment subsidies will spread the 
development more with lower cost impacts on the DSOs but also lower generation efficiency. 
Market participation of DG/RES 
DG/RES operators can access power markets either by making single units participate directly or by 
aggregating several units to a portfolio which matches the usual criteria for market participation. The 
incentive to participate in power markets depends on the kind of operating support: under price 
premiums and quota schemes, DG/RES operators market their electricity themselves. However, special 
rules for small generators – e.g., lower fixed annual energy exchange fees – can facilitate integration. 
Such special fees are implemented in the Nordic and German energy exchanges. A crucial factor for 
active network management by the DSO is whether it is informed about the generation schedule. This 
information is necessary for planning actions of activating demand response or adjusting generation 
schedules including the optimisation of local storage options. In the planning perspective, active 
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management includes also investment planning so as to balance the benefits and costs of expected 
DG/RES investments.   
Participation in ancillary services 
Ancillary services comprise a wide field of necessary network services, such as the provision of 
frequency control, voltage control, black-start capability, island operation, solution of network 
constraints and organising balancing mechanisms. DSOs do not operate any ancillary service markets 
until now, but participation in regulating markets is possible in most countries. Minimum capacity 
requirements are a hindrance for DG/RES market entrance. Most local voltage problems could be 
solved through active cooperation of DG in voltage control services. A pro-active DSO would then take 
over part of the responsibilities for system stability from the TSO and can thus extend its 
responsibilities. 
Allocation of costs arising from DG/RES integration 
The costs a DSO faces due to DG/RES integration, if fully acknowledged in network regulation, are 
generally recovered through deep or shallowish connection charges or Use-of-System charges. The 
level and kind of costs depend highly on the penetration and local conditions. Generally, none of the 
survey countries considers compensation payments for DG/RES due to advantages DSOs have because 
of these units. The impact of network costs, losses and quality of service is not taken into account in the 
Netherlands and Spain. German regulation considers it implicitly. In Denmark, necessary new 
investments due to DG/RES lead to a higher revenue cap, whereas network losses and the impact on 
quality of service are not considered. The UK regulatory regime regards DG as an explicit cost factor 
and, additionally, allows a higher revenue cap due to innovation activities and registered power zones 
(where a more active network management approach can be followed). 
Planning of grid expansion with regard to DG/RES 
In order for DG to be able to deter or delay possible future network investments, it is necessary for the 
DSOs to make sure that DG will be producing/not producing when it is required by the system. Thus, 
some level of controllability of the output of DG by DSOs is necessary. DSOs in Denmark and the UK 
can sign contracts with DG/RES generators. This allows the former to partially control the output of the 
latter. Regulation in other countries does not consider this possibility. DSOs in most countries do not 
consider the possibility of avoiding network reinforcements because of the presence of DG. What is 
more, there are some countries, like the Netherlands, where DSOs have traditionally considered DG to 
be a potential source of problems. An exception to this rule is the UK, where DSOs seem to be 
encouraged to take DG into account in the planning process. 
 
Impact of DG/RES integration on the quality of service 
Quality of service levels have a direct impact on the allowed DSO revenues in most of the regarded 
countries. DG/RES units can have positive or negative effects on this, which also depends on network 
operation. If part of the potential benefits brought about by DG in terms of quality of service were 
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reflected in DSOs’ revenues, the latter would consider the possibility of connecting more DG and 
interacting with it in order to reduce supply interruptions. Implementing DG controllability and 
realizing the potential for increase in quality of service would probably require the use of active 
network management techniques, such as balancing control capabilities, in situations where 
transmission grids are disconnected or in black start situation. DG/RES could also keep part of the 
benefits caused by their contribution to quality of service levels for themselves. 
Incentives for innovation 
In general, innovations are expected to support the development of a conventional, “passive” DSO to 
an “active” DSO considerably. This would benefit DG/RES integration. Innovation incentives could be 
associated with the reduction of grid expansion and operation costs (energy price and losses) and the 
increase of service quality levels. Since the investments in R&D and innovative activities are risky, the 
regulator should allow cost recovery through the revenue cap regulation or provide financial support in 
the first stages of the innovation process until the benefits resulting from the introduction of these 
innovations become clear. 
Revenue stream model 
DG/RES revenues are firstly determined by the level of the support. Secondly, revenues are affected by 
electricity market developments depending on the type of support scheme implemented. Different 
support schemes can provide the same level of long term support, but at the same time have different 
risk allocation characteristics in the shorter term. DG investors generally favour up front support with 
the lowest risk, but it is rather the active integration of DG in the markets that results in system 
efficiency gains, especially in the case of flexible and controllable DG technologies. Market based 
subsidy schemes are to be preferred for efficiency reasons.  The effect of DG investment on 
distribution grids within the same power market is independent of the choice of subsidy scheme. 
Allowing DG to take part in the regulating power markets will produce benefits to the DG operator if 
regulating market prices are higher than wholesale electricity market prices. Allowing this flexible 
allocation of generation between the markets will produce overall economic benefits in a similar way 
as allowing transferring generation in time by the simple exposure to market prices for DG on the day 
ahead markets. The participation on two markets is assumed to produce no additional costs to the DSO. 
Transaction costs artificially set above real costs might obstruct efficient deployment of DG 
technologies in these markets. 
The network elements of the revenues and the interaction between DG and DSO can be addressed by 
possible reductions in connection charges as a response to cost savings for the DSO. An efficient 
network regulation should allow the DSO to provide investment incentives to DG up to a level of DG 
penetration where network losses can no longer be reduced. This means that the reduced network losses 
should be kept as increased profits for the DSO under the regulation regime allowing it to pass a share 
of this to the DG in the form of, for example, reduced connection charges. Connection charges could 
still be regulated with a maximum equivalent to shallow or shallowish connection charges. If, by 
contrast, network loss reduction was deducted from the price or revenue cap, then there would be no 
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incentive for an efficient level of DG in the different DSO grids. An alternative to reduced connection 
charges could be location dependent UoS charges. 
 
Economic impacts of DG/RES integration on power markets 
The power market is divided into several submarkets according to the time to delivery. Large amounts 
of fluctuating generation with low marginal costs have a strong impact on spot market prices. Intraday 
spot markets are a means of correcting the day-ahead plans without having to use the regulating power 
market. It can generally be assumed that higher DG/RES penetration leads to a higher usage of these 
markets because market participants want to correct forecast errors without having to use the more 
expensive regulating markets. In a geographically small market, such forecast errors will show a high 
correlation among all units of a generation technology and have a uniform impact on market prices. 
Regulating power is traditionally supplied by hydro storages and large condensing power plants and 
organized centrally by the respective TSO. There are better possibilities for DG/RES to participate in 
minute and secondary regulating power markets as these are rather short-term based. In most cases, this 
requires grouping them to virtual power plants and controlling them with necessary communication 
infrastructure. Participation in primary regulating power markets is even under such conditions hardly 
achievable because the offered capacity has to be available during the whole period. 
It seems that concerns about market power decrease strongly when the capacity bid into the market is 
divided between as many actors as possible. If DG/RES capacities are not marketed through the trading 
divisions of large vertically integrated companies, they can help to mitigate market power. 
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2. Economic analysis of DG/RES and DSO operations 
This chapter deals with the impact of network regulation and support schemes for DG operators and 
DSOs, respectively. In order to point out the - partially conflicting - incentives of these market actors 
involved, this chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the status quo of existing regulation and how it 
impacts DG operators and DSOs. This qualitative analysis will be supplemented by a simple analytical 
approach on the impact on revenue streams in the subsequent chapter. 
2.1 Level of integration between DSOs and DG/RES generation 
Vertical integration (through ownership) between network operators, in particular DSOs, and DG/RES 
generation influences the incentives of market actors in different directions. On the one hand, there is 
the importance of providing fair and non-discriminatory access to the network to third parties. 
Networks constitute essential facilities with natural monopoly characteristics; this necessitates the 
independence of DSOs so as to guarantee a level playing field and equitable access conditions for all 
market actors. Owning DG/RES generation in their distribution areas might encourage DSOs to favour 
the connection and operation of their own plants to the detriment of units operated by competing 
operators that are located in the same distribution area. A conflict may arise between the regulated 
activity of DSOs and their interests in the generation sector. On the other hand, vertical integration of 
DSOs and DG/RES production may facilitate the coordination between the distribution activity and the 
operation of these distributed generators. This may contribute to solving operational problems more 
efficiently in a distribution network area. 
2.1.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
The level of integration between DSOs and DG/RES generation is subject to the unbundling 
requirements stipulated by the Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC [12]. Four levels of unbundling can be 
distinguished: ownership unbundling, legal unbundling, functional unbundling, and unbundling of 
accounts. 
Ownership unbundling is the most far reaching unbundling measure. It constitutes the separation of an 
undertaking’s generation assets from its network assets. Dir. 2003/54/EC stipulates legal and functional 
unbundling for TSOs and DSOs: if the TSO or DSO is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, it 
shall be independent at least in terms of its legal form, organization and decision making from other 
activities not relating to transmission (Art. 10 (1)) or, respectively, distribution (Art. 15 (1)). In other 
words, legal unbundling involves the setting up of a separate network company whereas functional 
unbundling is a prerequisite in order to ensure the independence of network operators in terms of 
organization and decision making processes. Functional unbundling encompasses management 
separation for the day-to-day operation from any other segment of the value chain, independence of 
management, separation of effective decision making rights, and the adoption of a compliance 
programme (cf. Art. 10(2), Art. 15 (2)). Furthermore, Dir. 2003/54/EC lays down unbundling of 
accounts (Art 19). This entails the keeping of separate accounts for transmission and distribution 
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activities as it would be required if these activities were carried out by separate undertakings. For 
TSOs, the new Directive Proposal [4] envisions a reinforcement of the existing provisions at the 
transmission level through the implementation of ownership unbundling or the establishment of 
independent system operators. For DSOs, the unbundling requirements remain unchanged. 
Notably, there are three exemptions to the unbundling requirements, all of them directly affecting 
DSOs. First, at the distribution level, Member States could postpone the implementation of legal 
unbundling of DSOs until 1 July 2007 (Art. 30(2), Dir. 2003/54/EC)1. Second, small DSOs serving 
less than 100.000 connections may be exempted from the unbundling requirements (Art. 15, Dir. 
2003/54/EC), i.e., both from legal and functional unbundling [15]. The application of this exemption 
clause is left to the discretion of the Member States and not limited in time (ibid). Last, Art. 17, Dir. 
2003/54/EC, allows the existence of combined operators, that is, combined TSO/DSOs as long as 
they belong to the same sector. Table 1 provides an overview of the existing implementation of 
unbundling provisions at the distribution and transmission level for the five country cases. 
Table 1: Unbundling Electricity 2006 [6] 
  Number 
of TSOs 
Number of 
ownership 
unbundled 
TSOs 
Number 
of DSOs 
Number of 
legally 
unbundled 
DSOs 
Number of DSOs 
<100.000 
customers 
(100.000 
customers 
exemption applied)
Denmark 1 [1] 1 [1] 107 [107] 110 [107] 103 [100] 
(N) 
Germany 4 [4] 0 [0] 876 [877] NA 799 [799] 
(Y) 
Netherlands 1 [1] 1 [1] 9 [9] 9 [9] 5 [5] 
(Y) 
Spain 1 [1] 1 [1] 326 [326] 326 [326] 320 [320] 
(Y) 
United 
Kingdom 
1 [1] 1 [1] 18 [18] 18 [18] 4 [4]2 
(N) 
 
Both at the transmission and at the distribution level, unbundling has widely been adopted in Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The exemption clause for DSOs serving 
less than 100.000 connections is applied in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. This means that in 
Germany, 799 of 877 DSOs may be exempted from the unbundling requirement; in Spain, 320 of 326 
DSOs may be subject to exemption. 
                                                 
1 Except for derogations, Member States had to comply with Dir. 2003/54/EC at the national level by 1 July 2004 (Art. 30 
(2)). Note that irrespective of the postponement of legal unbundling, functional unbundling of DSOs yet had to be in place. 
2 Data in brackets [ ] indicating most recent 2007 data, where available, unless reference to 2005 data is explicitly indicated. 
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2.1.2 Impact on DG/RES Operator 
For a DG/RES operator, non-discriminatory network access and transparent network access charges are 
pivotal to guarantee equitable access to the essential facility, i.e., the network. Vertical integration of 
network operators inherently contains incentives to delimit entry of competitors; these incentives 
decrease with a higher degree of unbundling. For a DG/RES operator facing a vertically integrated 
network operator, the danger of prohibitive access conditions by means of potentially discriminatorily 
high connection and/or Use of System charges is particularly pronounced if these charges are not 
regulated. Due to the asymmetry in information on network impact and cost between the DSO and the 
DG operator, a lack of transparency in the determination of costs may further aggravate entry, in 
particular if the charges are subject to negotiation. That is, the impact of vertical structure cannot be 
seen disentangled from the impact of the regulation. 
However, there is also another side of the coin: in the case that a DSO operates DG/RES himself, 
synergies between the network and the generation segment can be realized in a more efficient manner 
(see below). In particular for small DSOs falling under the exemption clause, these synergies may be 
vital to sustain in the market. The (in some cases possibly negligible) danger of vertical foreclosure on 
a local scale for new small-scale DG generators therefore needs to be weighed against the burden and 
problems if unbundling is imposed on small vertically integrated DSOs. DSOs above the exemption 
limit size might be able to achieve the system efficiency benefits of integration operations with 
DG/RES through arm’s length contractual arrangements instead of vertical integration.  
2.1.3 Impact on DSO 
Several kinds of ownership groups can have different goals for a DSO: a purely financial investor will 
try to obtain the highest return, whereas other ownership forms as collective or municipal can have 
DG/RES integration and energy independence as other objectives. This will in particular be the case if 
local benefits from DG/RES are high, e.g., through collective ownership of RES or lower heating costs 
due to CHP. The political attitude towards active network management and DG/RES integration can 
thus differ under different ownership options; however, purely financial investors as owners can lead to 
a more professional network management and profit from experience from other DSO regions where 
they operate as well. 
The DSO has a crucial position between all distribution network stakeholders. Optimally for DG/RES, 
it fulfils this coordination role as an active network manager providing communication infrastructure. If 
a DSO operates DG himself, the location and load integration of DG/RES can be chosen cost-
optimally. The potential for network reinforcement delays or replacement by generation capacity can 
be exploited better in this combination; furthermore, the DSO will integrate DG/RES operation issues 
into its own point of view and proceed faster from passive to active network management. Using more 
complex metering and Intelligent Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure together with the 
possibility of charging time and/or location dependent use of system charges might also provide 
sufficient incentives for obtaining cost-optimal allocations. 
14 
2.1.4 Regulatory implications 
Regulation on provisions governing the unbundling of DSOs has to balance the danger of a vertically 
integrated DSO exercising local market power (e.g., aggravation of network access for competitors in a 
rural network) against the financial and operational burden unbundling imposes on small DSOs that 
have to sustain against large-scale generators in the European electricity market. It may be further 
subject to discussion whether the exemption clause should be harmonized, or whether it should 
continue to be to the discretion of Member States. 
2.2 Network regulation 
The regulation and level of network charges are pivotal for the access conditions of DG/RES 
generators; this applies in particular to third party access for generators not owning and operating 
networks themselves. Due to the essential facility characteristics of networks, the regulation of network 
charges has to be regarded in association with the effective unbundling of incumbent vertically 
integrated companies. Network charges can be differentiated with respect to connection charges to be 
paid for obtaining the initial connection to the network, and the network tariff. 
The methodology applied for the computation of connection and use of the system charges provides 
inherently incentives for the DSO to promote or not to promote the connection of new DG/RES 
generators. Art. 23 (2a) of Dir. 2003/54/EC [12] lays down that it is the responsibility of the regulatory 
authorities to fix or approve at least the methodologies used to calculate or establish the terms and 
conditions for connection and access to national networks, including transmission and distribution 
tariffs. This implies that the methodologies are to the discretion of the individual Member States that 
have adopted different network regulation regimes. Furthermore, “regulatory authorities shall have the 
authority to require transmission and distribution system operators, if necessary, to modify the terms 
and conditions, tariffs, rules, mechanisms and methodologies […] to ensure that they are proportionate 
and applied in a non-discriminatory manner” (Art. 23 (4), ibid). 
2.2.1 Network access and connection charges 
In most systems, grid codes specify the conditions to be fulfilled in order for the DSO to provide access 
to the distribution grid to generators seeking their connection to it. However, there may be scope for the 
DSO to allege that significant difficulties exist which render the approval of the connection of a new 
DG/RES generator to the grid impossible. The DSO may refuse access where it lacks the necessary 
capacity (Art. 20 (2), Dir. 2003/54/EC). However, in such an instance duly substantiated reasons must 
be given as well as relevant information on measures that would be necessary to reinforce the network 
(ibid). 
Three major types of connection charges can be distinguished [1]: 
• Deep connection charges: the DG/RES operator incurs the costs for connection assets and all 
costs for all necessary network reinforcements, that is, at the distribution and at the transmission 
level. 
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• Shallowish connection charges: the DG/RES operator has to pay for the costs of connection 
assets and reinforcements at the distribution level. 
• Shallow connection charges: the DG/RES operator only incurs the direct costs for connection, 
and maybe the costs for a new transformer. 
2.2.2 Network tariffs 
The income of TSOs and DSOs is primarily derived from network tariffs. These are composed of 
different fees. Depending on their application in national regulation, these fees may comprise energy 
charges [MWh], capacity charges [MW], reactive power charges [MVAr], Use of System (UoS) 
charges and connection charges [1]. 
The type of connection charging philosophy, as outlined above, cannot be regarded in isolation from 
the network tariff. A DSO may recuperate in the case of shallow(ish) connection charges the 
reinforcement costs through UoS charges on generators and/or consumers. The simplest kind of UoS 
charge is a postage stamp tariff, where transmission/distribution charges paid by a certain group of 
generators/consumers are uniform, i.e., they incur the same charges regardless of their location and 
time of use. The underlying idea of introducing UoS charge differentiations is that different parties 
connected to the grid should pay the share of system usage they need. In sum, they represent the DSO’s 
revenue and need to be equivalent to its allowed revenue. This can be implemented by a multitude of 
different approaches: either both consumers and generators or only consumers can pay UoS charges. 
Furthermore, UoS charges can vary according to the voltage level each agent is connected to, or 
according to the location of agents (nodal/zonal pricing).  
Finally, different systems have implemented different splits of connection/UoS costs between 
generators and consumers. Thus, in some systems, both generators and consumers pay part of the grid 
costs (though normally the fraction paid by consumers is larger), whereas in others only consumers 
pay.  
The network tariff is embedded in the national network regulation regime. Network tariffs must add up, 
together with connection charges, to the total allowed network revenues of the DSO/TSO. The allowed 
revenues of the DSO/TSO may be strictly based on the cost incurred by this entity when developing 
and operating the network. This is known as cost of service regulation. Alternatively, allowed revenues 
may be based on the expected level of costs that would be incurred by an efficient reference company 
serving this area. Thus, if the actual costs are below (respectively above) the reference level, part of the 
difference would be earned (respectively, paid) by the DSO, which therefore is encouraged to cut costs. 
This is normally referred to as incentive regulation and can refer to capital (investment) costs or 
operational (losses and some maintenance) costs. This is further elaborated for the case of network 
losses in section 3 dealing with the analytical representation of the functioning of the system. 
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2.2.3 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
This section provides a review of national network regulation: this encompasses an overview of 
network regulation, the general application of connection and UoS charges (Table 2) as well as the 
more detailed design of UoS charges (Table 3). 
Incentive regulation, notably revenue cap, is the predominant network regulation regime in the five 
country cases. In Germany where cost of service regulation was still applied during the conduction of 
the country survey, revenue cap incentive regulation is implemented from the beginning of 2009 so that 
all five countries have either incentive or yardstick (Netherlands) regulation. 
Table 2: Network regulation, connection and Use of System (UoS) charges (2007) 
  
Network 
regulation 
 
Connection 
charges 
Are connection 
charges regulated 
or negotiated? 
 
Who pays UoS charges? 
 
Denmark 
 
Price/Revenue 
cap 
 
Shallow 
 
Regulated 
 
End consumers, 
Non-DG generators 
 
Germany 
 
Cost of service 
 
Shallow 
 
Negotiated 
 
End consumers 
 
Netherlands 
 
Yardstick 
Shallow below 
units of 10 
MVA, deep for 
units above 10 
MVA 
Regulated when 
below 10 MVA, 
negotiated above 10 
MVA. 
Only consumers pay UoS charges: 
- Large consumers:  
  fixed charge + capacity dependent 
charge 
- Small consumers: fixed UoS charge 
 
Spain 
 
Revenue cap 
 
Deep 
 
Negotiated3 
 
End Consumers 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
Revenue cap 
 
Shallowish 
 
Negotiated  
DG/RES pays DUoS, but exemption 
from TUoS charges. Large-scale power 
does not pay DUoS charges. 
As for connection charges, there is a wide spectrum of approaches adopted by the individual Member 
States. Both Denmark and Germany apply shallow charges, which are regulated in Denmark and 
subject to negotiation in Germany. The United Kingdom has implemented a shallowish charging 
regime in distribution, whereas in transmission generators pay shallow charges. Also in the United 
Kingdom, connection charges are negotiated. However, only incidentally cases are brought to the 
regulator. In Spain and in the Netherlands for units above 10 MVA, deep charges are implemented and 
subject to negotiation in both cases. By contrast, small-scale generation units below 10 MVA incur 
shallow regulated charges in the Netherlands.  
One way for the DSO to recuperate connection costs (in the case of shallow and shallowish charges) is 
by means of UoS charges. Costs can be socialized, i.e., spread among all network users, or levied 
                                                 
3 Connection lines, transformers, etc. are built and paid for by DG and then transferred to the DSOs. Further costs of 
upgrading existing installations to be paid by DG are computed by the DSOs under negotiation. 
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directly on generators that obtain the connection (see above). The allocation of charges is crucial as it 
determines which actors pay for the new connection and whether costs are recovered immediately by 
the DSO (deep charges) or whether they are recuperated over time. Out of the five country cases, only 
in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands, DG/RES generators pay UoS charges (Table 3). In the 
United Kingdom, DG/RES producers pay only distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges, but are 
exempted from transmission Use of System (TUoS) charges. DUoS charges are differentiated with 
respect to day and night and are related to a mix of drivers (kW and kWh). In the Netherlands, UoS 
services are split into system services and transport services; consequently, UoS charges consist of 
system charges and transport charges. DG operators incur UoS charges for system services, but only 
for the amount of electricity taken from the network. If net off-take in a year is 'negative', no system 
charges are levied. The charge is kWh based and should cover the costs for reserve requirements, 
black-out arrangements, costs related to maintaining the power stability, etc. Transport charges are 
either kW based or both kW and kWh based, dependent of the network level. A DG-operator does not 
pay transportation costs for the energy supplied to the grid. These charges do not exhibit any form of 
temporal or locational differentiation. DG generators in Denmark, Germany and Spain do not pay 
network use charges. 
Table 3: Application of Use of System charges (2007) 
 Are UoS charges 
applied for DG? 
How is this 
charge calculated 
(system services, 
transport 
services)? 
Differentiation (with 
respect to 
location/network 
voltage level/time of 
use) or uniform 
charge? 
UoS charge 
level 
 
Denmark 
No, not for most 
existing DG; new 
wind and CHP 
installations can be 
affected. 
 
/ 
- TSO customers: TSO     
postage stamp tariff only 
- Private customers:  
  DSO + TSO tariff 
0.54€/MWh for 
conventional 
generators (TSO 
access), 
26,20 €/MWh 
for private 
customers 
(14€/MWh TSO 
+ 12.20 €/MWh 
DSO; 
exemplary) 
 
Germany 
No, only end 
consumers pay 
UoS charges. 
 
/ 
 
Voltage level 
 
€/kW and €/kWh 
 
Netherlands 
DG operators pay 
system charges, 
but only for the 
amount of 
electricity taken 
from the network. 
End consumers 
UoS charges:   
- system charges 
(paid by DG) 
- transport charges 
(kW or both kW 
and kWh based, 
not paid by DG) 
Differentiation in voltage 
level (network) is 
applied. No 
differentiation with 
respect to location or 
time of use. 
The overall 
system services 
tariff was 1.17 
€/MWh in 2007  
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pay UoS charges. 
 
Spain 
 
No, only end 
consumers pay 
UoS charges. 
 
/ 
Differentiation in voltage 
level, time of use and the 
maximum instantaneous 
power consumed in each 
period (if ToU applies). 
- Annual 
capacity charges 
for LV 
households: 
18.16 €/kW  
- Energy charges 
for LV 
households: 0.02 
€/kWh 
 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes. DG/RES 
pays DUoS, but 
does not pay 
TUoS charges. 
The regulator 
OFGEM 
encourages DSOs 
to make their use-
of-system charges 
more cost-
reflective.  
DUoS charges are based 
on pence per kWh, with 
a differentiation for day 
and night electricity 
generation. 
Charges are 
related to a mix 
of drivers (kW 
and kWh). 
2.2.4 Impact on DG/RES operator 
The choice of connection charging approach determines the cost and risk allocation between the 
DG/RES operator and the DSO. In the case of deep charges, the DSO recuperates the investment costs 
immediately up front. By contrast, under a shallow charging regime, the DSO gets reimbursed for the 
costs over time, typically by recovering them via use of system charges. 
With regard to connection charges, the DG/RES operators have a clear preference for shallow 
connection charges. The financial expenses are not only lower than under shallowish or deep 
connection charges, but risk exposure is decreased as well: when a new generation unit is planned, it is 
quite uncertain which network reinforcements the TSO and DSO consider necessary under deep 
connection charges. The same argument applies to shallowish connection charges. 
In terms of Use of System charges, DG/RES operators obviously prefer the approach when those are 
borne by consumers only. UoS charges can consist of annual fixed fees (€/kW) and variable tariffs 
(€/kWh). It is advantageous if DG/RES are legally defined as generation units only and the few kWh 
they need themselves, e.g., for communication equipment during times of non-generation, is net 
metered against their generation. Otherwise, they can face relatively high annual fixed fees as 
consumers linked to a certain voltage level. 
2.2.5 Impact on DSO 
In general, a DSO will prefer deep connection charges to recover all costs linked to the connection of a 
new generation unit. An exemption case can occur if the DSO wants to increase its interest-bearing 
regulatory asset base, e.g., under cost-plus regulation. Apart from this, a DSO favours the fastest and 
most extensive cost recuperation method, i.e., deep connection charges. Locational signals for the 
construction of DG/RES facilities are desirable from a DSO point of view. Besides, they are the 
simplest way to turn DG/RES beneficial for grid operations. Locational incentives provided by one-
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time upfront payment have a stronger impact compared to those produced by locational power prices 
(that is, reflecting temporary network restrictions). One-shot payments provide strong locational 
signals, whereas those provided by power prices or UoS charges are weaker since these prices cannot 
be predicted with enough accuracy by generators or promoters at the time when these generators are 
installed. On the other hand, locational power prices adapt automatically to network and market 
conditions while one-shot payments may deviate from the actual cost that each generator makes the 
system incur. 
Several network charging options may be considered: 
1. Applying deep connection charges to generators. No UoS charges are applied. 
2. Applying deep charges only for the fraction of the cost of reinforcements that each generator is 
deemed to be responsible for. No UoS charges are applied. 
3. Applying shallow connection charges and no UoS charge to generators. 
4. Applying a combination of shallow connection charges and UoS charges. 
When only shallow locationally differentiated connection charges are applied to generators (option 3), 
the remaining fraction of the cost of the grid that is attributable to generators should be socialized either 
to generators, to consumers, or to both of them through common uplifts in use of system charges.  
A trade off must be achieved between the efficiency in the allocation of grid costs, the computation of 
locational signals and the incentives provided for promoters to install new DG/RES generation: 
1. This option does not provide the right efficiency incentives, since DG/RES generators would 
have to pay the cost of many network reinforcements that will be used not only by them but also 
by other agents. Besides, it clearly discourages the installation of new DG/RES generation. 
2. This other option provides the right locational signals from a conceptual point of view. By 
making DG/RES generators responsible for the grid costs they are expected to cause, these 
charges would encourage promoters to install DG/RES generators where it is most efficient in 
terms of the total costs incurred by the system. Therefore, if these charges were applied, the 
DSO would be encouraged to promote the connection of new DG/RES generator to its grid. 
However, new DG/RES generators would face high entry costs and therefore promoters would 
not be encouraged to install new generation. One drawback of this option is that the charges 
paid by DG/RES generators would probably deviate from the actual use these generators end-up 
making of the grid. Therefore, if these deviations were significant, these charges could be 
regarded as unfair 
3. This option encourages promoters to build new generation but makes the connection of 
DG/RES generation less attractive to the DSO and less efficient. 
4. This is an intermediate situation whereby the resulting locational signals are not as strong as 
under option 1 (the final payment to be faced by DG/RES generators is not known in advance). 
Therefore, the location of DG/RES generators may not be as efficient as under option 2. 
20 
However, generators would receive a locational signal, based on the estimation of the network 
usage charges to be faced by them, which is likely to go in the right direction in most cases. As 
in option 3, entry payments faced by DG/RES generators would be small. However, in this case 
total payments would be significant. 
If DSOs have to pay the cost of the reinforcement caused by DG/RES generators and cannot fully 
recover it from their customers, they will try to prevent new generators from installing. 
 
2.3 Remuneration of DG/RES 
The remuneration of DG/RES operators involves two important aspects: first, many DG/RES 
technologies are still not competitive in commercial terms compared to conventional generation. Their 
positive externalities, such as their low emissions impact, contribution to enhancing energy efficiency, 
diversification of the energy mix and security of supply, etc. have been rationales for the promotion of 
RES- and CHP-based electricity. Second, the remuneration of the generation within a distribution area 
may condition the operation profile of the corresponding units. Here, a distinction should be made 
between RES generation that makes use of primary energy sources that exhibit natural or operational 
variability4 and cannot be stored economically for the time being, and the remaining RES/DG 
generation. The remuneration scheme adopted for each generation technology may encourage 
generators to produce energy when it is more valuable for the system and provide other type of system 
services during the remaining time (at least in the case of conventional DG generation or RES 
generation where primary energy storage is possible). The generation of the first type should probably 
be used whenever the primary energy source is available and as long as system stability allows it, 
whereas the operation of the latter type of generation should depend on the existing conditions. 
Besides, an efficient remuneration scheme should encourage generation promoters to install new plants 
where they may be more valuable or necessary. The operation and geographical distribution of 
DG/RES units may affect the price of energy in the system. They may also affect distribution and 
transmission congestion and losses, which will in turn have an impact on the amount and nature of 
network reinforcements to be undertaken.  
Directive 2001/77/EC ([11], RES-E Directive) and Directive 2004/8/EC ([13], CHP Directive) lay 
down that Member States may give direct or indirect support for electricity produced from renewable 
energy sources or cogeneration based on a useful heat demand, respectively. The choice and level of 
the support instruments are to the discretion of the Member States. This allows accounting for the state 
of maturity of the individual technologies and the specific conditions in each Member State. Support 
schemes can be subdivided into investment support (e.g., capital grants) and operating support. The 
latter type of support can be distinguished into price-based and quantity-based support schemes. The 
prevalent price-based support schemes are feed-in tariffs and price premiums. Feed-in tariffs mean that 
                                                 
4 Wind and photovoltaic constitute examples of energy sources with natural variability, whereas CHP is an example for 
operational variability when power generation is dictated by heat demand. 
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DG/RES units receive a fixed tariff per produced kWh for a certain period of time. These tariffs can be 
differentiated between technologies and other factors as efficiency requirements. By contrast, price 
premiums are bonus payments per kWh on top of market prices to facilitate market integration of 
DG/RES. Under quantity-based support schemes, an obligation to have a certain share of DG/RES 
generation is imposed on utilities, traders or consumers. One possibility are quota systems combined 
with the setting up of financial markets for tradable green certificates: for the generation of green 
electricity, a corresponding amount of green certificates is issued that in turn can be traded on the green 
certificate market. The revenue of DG/RES generators is hence composed of the sum of the electricity 
price and of the certificate price. 
2.3.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation  
 
Table 4: Support mechanisms 
 Prevalent support mechanisms 
Denmark Price premium 
Germany Feed-in tariff 
Netherlands Price premium 
Spain Feed-in tariff and price premium 
United Kingdom Quota system with TGCs (Renewable Obligation) 
 
Many of the considered countries have opted for either of 2 energy remuneration schemes: feed in 
tariffs (FIT) or a system of premiums over the price of energy in the system dispatch (premium). Some 
exceptions exist, nevertheless. Spain allows promoters to choose between both remuneration systems. 
Germany has implemented a system of FIT with the exception of CHP generation, which earns the 
market price plus a premium. The regulation in place in the German system in relation to the 
remuneration of DG has recently changed but latest changes are not considered in this review. In the 
Netherlands, DG/RES generators receive a variable premium over the market price. In Denmark, the 
system applied depends on the generation technology: on-shore wind generators receive a premium, 
off-shore wind capacity is contracted through a tendering process, CHP generation with biomass 
receives a feed in premium and photovoltaic generation is subject to a system of net metering. Finally, 
in the UK a system of green certificates is in place whereby generation companies are forced to 
produce a certain fraction of their total output from renewable energy sources. RES generators’ 
revenues result from the sale of their green certificates. The information from the own survey has been 
supplemented through questionnaires answered by parties in the different countries in the context of the 
SOLID-DER project [8]. 
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Only the system of premiums results in the price of energy earned by DG/RES generators changing 
according to the value of this energy for the system at each time. However, other countries like Spain 
have implemented other incentives for generators to produce power when their energy is more valuable 
for the system. CHP, biomass and waste generators in Spain that opt for a feed-in tariff earn a different 
regulated price during peak and off-peak hours. 
The payments received by RES/DG generators in most of these systems depend on the type of 
technology considered as well as on the size of the generator. The level of payments to generators of 
each technology mainly depends on the investment and production costs faced by this type of 
generators. The objective of regulatory authorities in most systems is to achieve the installation of a 
predetermined amount of generation capacity from each technology. Therefore, despite of the fact that 
the operation profile and voltage level of the grid where generators are connected varies from one 
generation technology to another, differences in payments among generation technologies should not 
be seen as a form of temporal and voltage level differentiation. In other words, differences in payments 
to generators across technologies are not directly related to the value that the energy produced by each 
type of generators has for the system depending on the time when this energy is produced and the 
voltage level where it is injected into the grid. The remuneration scheme in place in some systems, like 
the Spanish one, is deemed to encourage DG/RES generators to produce as much energy as they can 
whenever it is possible. 
Prices earned by RES/DG generators in the considered countries do not exhibit any form of 
geographical differentiation with the exception of Denmark, where different prices may be computed 
for the two subsystems within the country. Regarding the responsibility for deviations from their 
program, or expected output, UK generators are not penalised for these deviations, while generators in 
Denmark receive an average compensation based on the level of the balancing costs they are expected 
to incur. Generators in Spain and the Netherlands are responsible for the balancing costs they make the 
system incur (due to deviations from their program). 
2.3.2 Impact on DG/RES operator 
A Member State’s choice of support scheme is the main driver for DG/RES development next to the 
general level of support. With regard to system integration and incentives to improve integration with 
the distribution grid, DG/RES revenue could be composed of the following factors in the future: 
Revenue = Market price + price premium + ancillary services provision + bonuses 
The market price is self-explaining; the price premium is the Member State’s main DG/RES promotion 
instrument. Alternatively, these two factors can be replaced by a FIT. Several bonuses are possible: a 
system service bonus reflects an additional payment for meeting certain technical standards which are 
beneficial for the network, e.g., for participation in frequency stability. Such a factor can be defined 
nationally as part of the remuneration scheme, but it is also possible that the TSO or DSO has a 
willingness to pay for it if it is beneficial for network operation. Another possible bonus is a dispatch 
bonus for operating at times when the network situation is constrained or deviates from plans; this also 
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comprises income from ancillary services, such as for participation in balancing markets and offering 
black upstart capacity. The last income factor could be locational bonuses for placing and operating the 
DG/RES unit where and when there are network constraints. This formulation draws the attention to 
two possible implementations: the first possibility is locational power prices which are variable over 
time, i.e., they are included in the market price and reflect the current system situation. As they depend 
on demand, other generators and system changes, they are extremely difficult to forecast over a long-
term basis and can therefore constitute a high financial risk for DG/RES investors. The second 
possibility is one-time ahead payments: the DSO could publish a list of beneficial sites, desired 
generation technologies and capacities. A certain investment grant will be given to the DG/RES 
operator. For the DG/RES operator, this is risk-free; for the DSO, it corresponds to the opportunity cost 
if DG/RES is placed randomly. In the subsequent chapter 3, only the bonus transferred as reduced 
connection charge is assessed because it is expected to create the largest incentive to DG location 
decisions.  
2.3.3 Impact on DSO 
The design of the national DG/RES support scheme has a strong impact on the DSO: if the operation of 
a technology is profitable in the DSO region, numerous units can be installed within a short timeframe 
(compared to the timeframe of grid expansion). If DG/RES have priority access, the DSO does not 
have any influence on the location of new facilities. In addition, the DSO can be charged with 
implementing the support scheme locally, e.g., metering and administering energy amounts and 
payments locally.  
 If the DSO is responsible for remuneration by the FIT, it needs to be ensured that this is not mixed 
with other subjects as grid connection charges etc.  The new German FIT ([17], §§ 11, 12) is designed 
in such a way that newly connected DG/RES units have to receive the FIT, regardless if they can 
actually produce or if they cannot due to network congestion.  Very few DG/RES full load hours in a 
grid can require high additional capacity investment. With the new flexibility the DSO can decide 
where the optimal balance between network extension and paying the FIT without receiving any power 
will be reached (compensation payment). Ideally, the DSO will strengthen the network to a socially 
optimal point in this respect. A practical problem arising is the question to which extent the DSO’s 
valuation is correct, i.e., to which extent the regulator accepts these compensation payments having an 
impact on use-of-system charges. 
2.3.4 Regulatory implications 
The value for the system (and the DSO) of the energy produced by RES/DG generators depends on the 
time and the place where it is produced. Therefore, energy prices earned by these generators should 
exhibit some form of temporal and geographical differentiation. Then, non-intermittent, controllable 
generators would be encouraged to produce energy when the system in general and the DSO in 
particular can get a higher value from this energy. Besides, promoters could be encouraged to install 
new RES/DG generation where it is more valuable for the system and the DSO. In order for 
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locationally and temporally differentiated prices not to be perceived by DG/RES as a risk source, 
annual average prices should be more or less stable. Thus, homogenous prices could be computed for 
several groups of hours throughout the year. Besides, price zones could be defined priory-based on 
existing transmission constraints. In addition, DG generators should be allowed to sign long term 
supply contracts for a fraction of their total production so that they are guaranteed the recovery of their 
investment after some time.  
This would be automatically achieved if prices earned by DG/RES generation were indexed to the 
market price (a system of premiums were implemented) and market prices internalized the effect of 
congestion and losses in the dispatch (zonal/nodal energy prices were applied). If prices earned by 
DG/RES generation are not indexed or in some other way related to the market price, they should at 
least exhibit some form of temporal differentiation based on the time of the day, and the time of the 
year, when RES energy is produced. Several blocks of hours could be defined and the price of energy 
could be computed separately for each of them. Analogously, the remuneration level of these 
generators could vary from one area of the system to another. In order to achieve this, separate 
congestion and losses economic signals could be sent to generators. 
Generators should face penalties when they deviate from their scheduled program. This would 
encourage them to improve their prediction systems. In order to further reduce the level of these 
deviations, they should be allowed to join Virtual Power Plants since their aggregate output would 
probably be more predictable. Then, the corresponding DSO would have more certainty about the 
output of these generators and could better program the operation of the distribution grid. In those 
systems where the DSO is responsible for providing and complying with a program for the net 
generation/demand within its area, the DSO would incur lower balancing costs. If reducing the 
deviations in the output of generators of a certain type proves to be very difficult, these generators 
could receive a compensation corresponding to their expected level of balancing costs. 
A comparatively high remuneration of DG/RES can mitigate other barriers, such as high network 
charges. Both charges and support schemes should therefore be seen as an interdependent system, and 
major adjustments should only be made with reference to the other factor. 
2.4 Market participation of DG/RES 
Unbundling of system operators, non-discriminatory network access and sufficiently high remuneration 
of DG/RES are prerequisites for market entry of DG/RES operators. Another important aspect for the 
creation of free access for distributed as compared to central generation consists of market participation 
requirements for DG/RES operators, i.e., the accessibility of wholesale electricity markets for small-
scale generators.  In particular, this becomes crucial when DG/RES operators are not entitled to support 
schemes or receive more market-oriented support, such as quota systems with tradable green 
certificates or price premiums (in contrast to the traditional fixed feed-in tariff, which is typically 
coupled with priority access). In addition to financial and formal requirements (e.g., solvency, possibly 
additional collateral, registration, training, appointment of transporting party), there are frequently 
minimum capacity requirements and specific trading fee regimes generators need to pay. Depending on 
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the market rules in place, the latter two requirements may adversely affect small-scale generators. If 
they do not meet the minimum capacity requirement, they cannot de facto participate in the wholesale 
market; likewise, high trading fees may impede the entry of small-scale producers. 
2.4.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
Minimum capacity requirements exist in Denmark and Germany, whereas the Netherlands, Spain and 
the United Kingdom have no such requirements (Table 5).  In Denmark, the minimum capacity for 
bidding on the wholesale market amounts to 0.1 MW. In Germany, for participation in the OTC (over-
the-counter) trade or on the European Energy Exchange (EEX) generators need to have a size of at 
least 1 MW. 
Concerning trading fees, there are regimes in Denmark and Germany facilitating market access for 
DG/RES. At the Danish power exchange Nordpool Elspot, direct participants incur an annual fee of 
15000€ and a variable trading fee of 0.03 €/MWh (Nord Pool). There is a specific trading regime for 
small direct participants allowing them to waive the annual fee and pay a higher variable fee of 
0.13 €/MWh instead. As for Germany, there is an annual fee for the participation in all products of 
EEX Power Spot GmbH of 12500€. However, for market participants trading via a designated broker 
and whose annual trading volume amounts to less than 2.5 m€, the annual fee is reduced to 2500€ [18]. 
In the other three countries, there are no such specific regimes. 
 
Table 5: Wholesale market participation of DG/RES (2007) 
 Are there minimum 
capacity requirements 
for bidding on the 
wholesale market? 
 
Are there specific trading fee regimes for small-scale 
generators on the wholesale market? 
 
 
Denmark 0.1 MW 
 
Yes. Participants at Nordpool Elspot market can waive the 
annual fee of 15000 € and pay a higher variable fee of 0.13 
€/MWh instead. 
 
Germany 
 
> 1MW (OTC, EEX) 
 
Specific fee 
 
Netherlands 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Spain No size limitation exists. 
 
n.a. 
 
United 
Kingdom 
No, there is only a license 
(to supply) requirement 
for all generation units. 
Process of acquiring supply license for wholesale market can 
be costly, especially for small generators 
 
 
2.4.2 Impact on DG/RES operator 
The participation in power markets is both a chance and a threat for DG/RES operators when compared 
to a situation with a fixed FIT. It offers the possibility to market the generated electricity directly or 
26 
indirectly on the wholesale markets. For direct participation, special trading fees for small market 
actors can be a crucial integration factor. Indirect participation can happen through aggregators such as 
virtual power plants. Besides positive scale effects for market participation fees, this option includes 
the possibility of balancing several intermittent energy sources to reduce balancing costs. 
Different approaches to encourage market participation from a (former) FIT scheme have been 
practiced [3]: Denmark (2000-2008) and the Netherlands (2008 onwards) ensure an overall revenue as 
the sum of the market price and the price premium for certain technologies instead of giving a fixed 
premium on top of market prices. Temporary opt-out of the FIT, as it is practiced in Germany from 
2009 onwards, also aims at a better market integration. Generators can withdraw their units with one 
months notice from the FIT and return to FIT remuneration with the same notification period. These 
approaches can be seen as a transition step to a fixed premium or full self-marketing. 
Time-variable interaction with other market entities requires the provision of IT infrastructure. 
DG/RES operators have an interest to install such infrastructure only if they are compensated for it, 
either through adapted operating support or through higher expected revenues by market participation. 
2.4.3 Impact on DSO  
The DSO’s attitude towards market participation of DG/RES depends on the detailed market design 
and information flows. If congestion signals are reflected in market prices, the DSO has a clear 
preference for DG/RES market participation. However, if market participation does hardly affect the 
DSO except for providing communication infrastructure, it is rather indifferent. The issue of IT 
communication standards is highly relevant, as can be illustrated by the following example: if the 
DG/RES operator communicates only with the energy exchange (or its intermediate aggregator) and 
the TSO for balancing monitoring, the DSO will not be able to adjust its network to the actual 
generation of the unit. In such a case, the DSO can only react with a time lag. Hence, the possibility for 
inclusion of the DSO in information chains is important for active network management. 
Participation of DG/RES in energy markets may tend to be positive since prices earned by these 
generators would then vary according to existing conditions in the global system (global balance of 
demand to available generation capacity), which will most likely resemble those in the DSO area in 
many cases. Thus, DG would be encouraged to produce in times when demand is high (also in the 
area), thereby helping to reduce line flows to be managed by the DSO. On the one hand, if the 
aggregate price earned by DG participating in the market (market price + premium) is too high, these 
generators will have insufficient incentives to cooperate with DSOs to overcome operation problems. 
Therefore, market premiums should not be too high. If distributed generators that participate in the 
market are held responsible for the deviations from their scheduled output, integrating them in the 
operation of the distribution area will be much easier for DSOs. On the other hand, if the DSO or local 
retailer is forced to buy all the power produced by DG (DG does not participate in the market) and 
DSOs are the only ones responsible for maintaining the power balance in the local system, operation of 
distribution areas where a large amount of DG exists will be much more difficult. 
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2.4.4 Regulatory implications 
Transitory support schemes can facilitate market integration of DG/RES units. Along with this, market 
participation rules are an important factor: low minimum capacity requirements and special trading fees 
for small direct participants can encourage direct marketing without the necessity of intermediate 
institutions. DG should be held responsible for the deviations from their scheduled output sold in the 
market. However, these generators should be allowed to merge their production with others’ and create 
VPPs or trade units to reduce these deviations. 
Participation in the market by DG is positive and should be encouraged so that generators receive 
economic signals related to the value of their energy for the system in each time. Variable premiums 
could be used for this. In order for DG not to perceive volatility of prices as a significant risk factor, 
they should be allowed to sign long term supply contracts for a fraction of their total production so that 
they are guaranteed the recovery of their investment after some time. Other alternatives are the 
application of zonal prices with some time differentiation, but not with an hourly resolution. 
2.5 Participation in ancillary services 
Increasing penetration levels of DG inevitably lead to the question how DG/RES can participate in the 
provision of ancillary services. Art. 2 (17) of Directive 2003/54/EC defines ancillary services (AS) as 
“all services necessary for the operation of a transmission or distribution system”.  A more concrete 
definition is that AS encompass “all services required by the transmission or distribution system 
operator to enable them to maintain the integrity and stability of the transmission or distribution system 
as well as the power quality” [21]. Ancillary services can be distinguished from system services. As for 
system services, they are supplied by a system functionality (e.g., system/network operator) to users 
connected to the system. Ancillary services are acquired by the system operator from system users 
(generators, loads and system assets) so as to be able to provide system services [21]. Various kinds of 
AS exist, with partially very different characteristics: 
• Frequency control: frequency is a global system variable. Three kinds of frequency control can 
be distinguished: 
o Primary frequency control is activated by a deviation in the system frequency and has 
the aim of establishing a new point of production and demand equilibrium with only a 
slight deviation from the nominal frequency. It is a local automatic control: all the 
generators within a synchronous zone that are fitted with a speed governor (or primary 
control device) perform this control automatically (on the demand side, frequency-
sensitive loads, such as induction motors, can participate as well) [34]. 
o Secondary frequency control is frequently automatic, but can also be manual.  Its 
purpose is to restore the nominal system frequency of 50 Hz and interchanges with 
neighbouring control areas to the planned values. Thus, the primary frequency control 
will be fully available again [10].  
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o Tertiary frequency control, also the so-called 15 minute reserve, can be automatic or 
manual. It encompasses manual changes in the dispatching and commitment of 
generating units so as to restore primary and secondary frequency control, to manage 
congestions in the transmission network, and to bring frequency and interchanges back 
to their set point when secondary control is unable to do the latter [34]. 
• Balancing markets: this is related to the frequency regulation service since its aim is correcting 
imbalances between generation and demand in the system. The financial responsibility for a 
part of the regulating power activation (frequency control) is allocated through balancing 
mechanisms. 
• Voltage control: voltage control involves the provision of reactive power by generation units in 
order to keep the voltage in certain nodes within the required limits. In order to provide reactive 
power, active power output of generators may have to be decreased, thus affecting their market 
revenues. Therefore, this service must be remunerated. Contrary to what happens in the load 
frequency regulation service, this service must be provided by units that are located in the same 
area where voltage problems are likely to arise. Therefore, the number of generators that can 
provide this service is fairly limited most of the times. Competition in the provision of this 
service can only take place locally.  
• Black-start capability: this involves providing the required amount of power and voltage 
support for the system in an area to be able to return to normal operation after having 
interrupted service because of an emergency that, otherwise, could have affected the integrity of 
the system. This service can only be provided by units that are able to operate in an autonomous 
way. 
• Island operation: in the future it would be very useful if DG could supply local load when 
their area needs to be disconnected from the rest of the system for emergency reasons. This 
would avoid service interruptions when the system as a whole runs into trouble and load 
shedding is required. 
• Solution of network constraints: this can be considered a type of congestion management 
service. Generators whose power output is affecting, or may affect, the flow through a 
congested line, may change their output so that the flow over this line is kept within the 
technical limits. The provision of this service is normally associated with the existence of a 
system of re-dispatch to manage congestion. If this is not the case, the solution of network 
constraints is generally managed through the process of allocation of scarce transmission 
capacity either in the energy market or as a separate one. Only the congestion that arises after 
the energy market takes place would be solved according to the aforementioned mechanism. 
 
The role of DG/RES generators in the provision of ancillary services could include the participation in 
congestion management schemes, the reduction of distribution and transmission losses, the 
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participation of these generators in the load following and the balancing services, the regulation of the 
reactive power they produce and that of the voltage in certain nodes. The provision potential of a kind 
of ancillary service depends on the DG/RES technology and its operation patterns. 
Ancillary services can be provided through several kinds of agreements or markets [35]: 
• Generators can be obliged to deliver them just by being connected to the grid, e.g., for basic 
voltage control. 
• The responsible system operator can buy them through bilateral contracts. 
• The system operator can tender necessary ancillary services over longer periods. 
• The system operator can buy them short-term at a spot market. 
In order to get generators to participate in the provision of these services, a system of regulated 
payments could be implemented in order to encourage, for example, RES/DG generators to keep their 
load factor within certain limits or to comply with certain requirements. Alternatively, the DSO could 
enter into ad-hoc contracts with these generators for them to provide system services. One last option 
involves allowing them to participate in the corresponding markets (assuming these markets exist). 
Different transaction types are possible for different kinds of ancillary services. Minimum bid sizes 
(e.g., in MW) and higher transaction costs can be an obstacle for DG/RES participation. 
Nevertheless, it would allow the DSO to count on these generators as an additional source of flexibility 
in the operation of the system, which may be more or less expensive depending on the particular 
generation type and technology but may become economical under certain conditions. 
 
The estimated impact of ancillary services (AS) revenues on DG revenue stream may depend on the 
ratio of prices earned for participation in AS to energy prices earned by DG. Normally, this impact 
tends to be rather incremental. The technical and market design will affect the potential of DG to 
contribute to the provision of AS. In general, DG needs to be controllable to participate in AS. Besides, 
the required communication infrastructure and protocols must be in place for DSOs/TSOs to interact 
with DG. Market design should encourage DG to participate in the provision of these services by 
allowing them to receive an adequate remuneration. Support schemes associated with the production of 
power by DG/RES should be based on the social value that this energy has. Incentives for DSO to 
integrate DG in the provision of these services should also exist. 
2.5.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
In order to provide these services, DG/RES generators have to comply with certain requirements that 
vary across countries. DG/RES generators in Spain must be controllable, send an offer that is larger 
than 10MW and sell their energy in the market or through contracts to provide AS. Generators in the 
Netherlands must be larger than 5 MW (though aggregation of units of the same type is allowed), and 
be connected to a voltage level that is 1 kV or higher. Large generators in Denmark can participate in 
30 
the balancing service. In order to provide this service, generators in Germany must submit an energy 
offer that is larger than 15MW, though aggregation in Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) is possible. 
 Services that can be provided by these generators in Spain include the balancing service, the load 
following one, the management of restrictions and the contribution to the system security of supply. 
Generators in the Netherlands can participate in several ancillary services, however, in practice, they do 
not make any contribution. An exception is CHP generation, which provides regulation reserves and 
participates in the balancing service. CHP in Denmark can participate in the balancing service, and 
islanding has only been implemented in pilot projects. DG in Germany can participate in the balancing 
market through the aggregation of the output of several units in VPPs. Moreover, there are plans to 
require these units to have fault ride through capability. 
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Table 6: Participation of DG/RES in Ancillary Services (2007) 
 Does DG provide ancillary services 
(e.g., energy for losses, reactive 
power)? 
Have AS 
markets 
run by 
DSOs been 
created in 
your 
system? 
Does the DG operator have 
direct access to the balancing 
market, i.e., to submit bids? 
 
Denmark 
No No Possible for units >11kW in 
blocks of >10MW 
 
Germany 
Yes No No 
 
Netherlands 
- Only units larger than 5 MW and 
connected to the 1 kV voltage 
network or higher can provide 
ancillary services 
- For these qualified units:  
in principle yes, in practice no 
No - Balancing market: indirect 
participation through 
commercial aggregators for 
distributed CHP operators 
(horticulture CHP operators) 
- Market for reserve power: large 
industrial CHP as well as large 
industrial interruptible demand 
 
Spain 
- Access for controllable RES/DG 
generators with capacity ≤ 10MW 
(aggregation of smaller units 
possible) 
- “Special Regime” (CHP and RES 
below 50MW): incentive provided to 
keep power factor between certain 
regulated ranges 
No - They can access regulation 
markets if they comply with the 
requirements stated to the left 
 
United 
Kingdom 
- DG can arrange with the DSO AS 
procurement  
- In practice, aggregated small DG 
can provide reserves. Bilateral 
agreements are likely to continue to 
be used in developing the ancillary 
service market in the short to 
medium term. 
No - In theory yes, but in practice 
the risks associated with 
operating in the balancing 
market are too large for singe 
operators. Therefore small 
operators tend to contract out to 
aggregators. 
 
DG/RES generators in Spain that comply with the criteria outlined above can participate in the existing 
ancillary services markets as any conventional generator. These markets are managed by the TSO. 
DSOs do not have the possibility to control the output of these generators. Neither the TSO nor DSOs 
can sign contracts with DG/RES generators for them to provide system services. DG/RES generators in 
the Netherlands can participate in AS markets (balancing market and reserve market). Generators in the 
UK and Denmark can either participate in certain AS markets (the balancing market in Denmark) or 
enter into contracts with the DSO. Therefore, DSOs in these systems have more control over the 
operation of these generators than Spanish or Dutch ones. Finally, DG/RES generators in Germany that 
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qualify for this service can participate in the balancing market. Organized ancillary services markets 
run by the DSO do not exist in any of the considered markets. At most, DSOs are allowed to sign ad-
hoc bilateral contracts with DG to provide these services. The information from the own survey has 
been supplemented through questionnaires answered by parties in the different countries in the context 
of the SOLID-DER project [8]. 
2.5.2 Impact on DG/RES operator 
A DG/RES generator can benefit from the participation in ancillary markets if remuneration is 
sufficient. However, establishing compulsory AS provision for DG that is not remunerated, like the 
provision of primary load frequency control, could erode the revenues of these generators resulting 
from the sale of power in the market or directly to the TSO/DSO. One must bear in mind that in order 
to provide most of these services distributed generators need to reduce their power output.   Integration 
and controllability of ancillary services from DG/RES would substantially contribute to the operations 
of a pro-active DSO. Thus, if DSOs begin to implement active network management (ANM) 
techniques, they will be encouraged to get DG into becoming partially controllable. Controllability by 
the TSO/DSO would result in this entity facilitating the grid connection and operation of DG. 
Significant expenses would also have to be borne by DG in order to become eligible for AS provision 
(control and communications equipment, system of regulation of their output, etc.). These expenses 
should be taken into account when computing the remuneration of DG for participation in AS. 
2.5.3 Impact on DSO 
The participation of DG/RES in AS can be highly beneficial for a DSO: system reserves from 
conventional resources can be smaller if dispersed generation units are allowed to provide this reserve 
and they are capable of doing so. Most local voltage problems could be solved through active 
cooperation of DG in voltage control services. A pro-active DSO will take over responsibilities of 
system stability from the TSO and can thus extend its responsibilities. 
 The potential impact on the DSO will be larger the more controllable DG is. Thus, DSOs that 
implement ANM techniques will benefit more from the participation of DG/RES in local services than 
those DSOs that operate their grid in a passive way. Both organised and bilateral markets should be 
created to create more flexibility for DSOs and generators to meet and agree on the conditions of the 
provision of these services by the latter. Services of a local nature, like the solution of voltage problems 
in each area, should be left to the discretion of DSOs.  
2.5.4 Regulatory implications 
DG/RES generators should be allowed to participate in the provision of AS if they are capable of doing 
so. In order to allow them to participate, requirements should be as flexible as possible. Aggregation of 
units into VPPS should be allowed so that they become part of observable units whose output is more 
controllable. 
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The participation of DG/RES and other generators in AS should be encouraged through the application 
of prices for the provision of these services that are in accordance with the value that the latter have for 
the system. Creating AS markets and allowing DG/RES generators to participate in them is the 
preferred mechanism to compute efficient prices for these services. Allowing the DSO to sign contracts 
with DG/RES generators may be advisable in situations where the number of generators that can 
provide a certain service is small (for example, the control of the voltage of a specific node). Setting 
regulated payments is not efficient in general since getting right the price for these services may be 
very difficult. However, this option must be considered when market power exists in the provision of a 
certain service. 
ANM techniques should be implemented and both organised, and bilateral markets should be created to 
create more flexibility for DSOs and generators to meet and agree on the conditions of the provision of 
these services by the latter. Services of a local nature, like the solution of voltage problems in each 
area, should be left in the hands of DSOs. 
2.6 Allocation of costs arising from DG/RES integration 
Costs borne by DSOs are affected by the existence of DG/RES generation. Therefore, the impact of DG 
on these costs should be somehow taken into account when computing the allowed remuneration of 
DSOs. It is the task of regulatory authorities to monitor that “the terms, conditions and tariffs for 
connecting new producers of electricity to guarantee that these are objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory, in particular taking full account of the costs and benefits of the various renewable 
energy sources technologies, distributed generation and combined heat and power” ([12], Art. 23f). 
Two different situations may occur: 
• For low penetration levels of DG, investment and operation costs of DSOs, as well as the cost 
of losses, tend to decrease as a result of the integration of this generation. An exception to this 
rule may be the cost of the connection infrastructure needed for new DG generators. 
• For high penetration DG levels, the cost of investments, operation and losses may increase (or 
decrease) as a result of the integration of this generation, with respect to the situation with no 
DG. 
The costs in both situations are highly dependent on the specific type of DG technology 
(controllability) and the network configuration. A given network might accommodate much higher 
penetration of certain technologies than other technologies before costs start to increase.  
The remuneration of the DSO in Denmark and the UK takes into account the network infrastructure 
costs caused by the connection of DG/RES. Investments caused by DG must be approved by the 
regulator in order for the corresponding costs to be included in the reference cost (allowed revenue) it 
computes. The UK regulator takes into account these costs when periodically updating the 
remuneration of DSOs (the reference level of costs). Besides, there are other incentives in the UK for 
the DSO to promote the installation of DG/RES, like the inclusion of investments in the Innovation 
Funding Incentive scheme if they are aimed at increasing the efficiency in the operation of the network 
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to allow more DG/RES to be integrated. If a distribution area is declared a Registered Power Zone, 
then additional incentives for the connection of DG/RES apply. For the computation of the 
remuneration of DSOs, two approaches are possible: either DG related costs are estimated in advance 
and included in the allowed DSO remuneration under an incentive based mechanism; or the costs 
incurred and declared by the DSO that are related to DG are included in the regulated remuneration of 
this entity, thus applying cost based regulation. 
In order to encourage the DSOs to facilitate the integration of DG/RES, increases in network/losses 
costs caused by DG should result in the same increase in the allowed remuneration of the DSO. On the 
other hand, the DSO should be allowed to retain part of the benefits (reductions in costs) yielded by the 
existence of DG. 
2.6.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
Regarding the compensation to DG operators for the benefits they cause the system, most of the 
considered systems do not include any compensation in the regulatory schemes. This is the case of 
Germany and the Netherlands. In Denmark, these compensations could be agreed bilaterally between 
the operator and the DSO, though no compensation is guaranteed in advance. In Spain, consideration of 
these benefits is not explicit. However, for lower levels of DG penetration, the generation is credited 
some potential for costs reduction and their incentives for production (premiums) are set higher. 
Finally, in the UK, no rule states that DG should be compensated, but the regulator recommends that 
DSOs charge generators cost reflective tariffs that, therefore, take into account the benefits that the 
latter provide to the system.  
Nevertheless, the remuneration of these companies in Germany and Spain does not take into account 
these costs. Yet, in the near-term future, DSOs’ revenues in both countries are expected to include 
them. Remuneration of Opex and Capex in Spain is computed using a formula that determines the 
reference level for these costs (incentive regulation). This formula is going to be replaced by the use of 
a network reference model which will also consider the impact on the reference grid development of 
the installation of new generators. The allowed DSOs’ revenues in Germany are based on the costs 
incurred by the DSO. Therefore, no incentive to reduce costs is provided. However, efficiency 
incentives will soon be introduced. 
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Table 7: Allocation of DG-related costs and benefits (2007) 
 Is the DG operator compensated for 
benefits the DSO has from connecting 
DG to the grid? 
Is the impact on network costs, losses and quality 
of service taken into account when computing the 
remuneration of DSOs? 
 
Denmark 
No - could be agreed bilaterally Network costs: Necessary new investments for DG 
lead to a higher revenue cap; 
Losses, quality of service: no 
 
Germany 
No Yes, but not explicitly 
(only included in other cost factors) 
 
Netherlands 
No No 
 
Spain 
- In general no consideration 
- FITs and premiums are generally set 
higher the smaller DG is, as a means of 
acknowledging better integration with 
demand5 
No 
 
United 
Kingdom 
No. The regulator more passively 
encourages DNOs to charge DG operators 
more cost reflective DUoS charges, thereby 
giving any advantages due to DG back to 
the operator contributing to this. 
- Explicit recognition of DG in periodic regulatory 
review of the DNOs 
- Additional incentives for DG deployment: 
• Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) 
• Registered Power Zones (RPZ) 
 
Remuneration of DSOs in the Netherlands results from a benchmarking process (incentive regulation). 
As it will be explained in section 5, the allowed level of remuneration includes the cost of network 
reinforcements caused by the connection of large DG, which has to pay them (deep connection 
charges). However, DSOs’ revenues do not include the cost of reinforcements caused by small DG, 
which only have to pay the connection infrastructure. Only the cost of those network investments 
caused by small generators that involve the replacement of an old line could be recovered through the 
revenues related to the depreciation of existing assets. Regulation in the Netherlands considers the 
possibility of extraordinary network reinforcements in general. Large network reinforcements caused 
by DG/RES generators are thought to be included in this part of regulation, but funds for financing 
these reinforcements have not been granted yet. 
The impact of DG/RES generation on distribution losses is not considered in any of these countries 
when computing the corresponding revenues to be earned by DSOs. All the countries, but Germany, 
compute a reference amount of losses that DSOs are compensated for. Therefore, DSOs in these 
countries have an incentive to reduce losses as much as possible. The reference level of losses is 
computed according to the following methods: 
                                                 
5 It is supposed that small DG connects to lower voltage levels and closer to demand, thus producing lower losses, 
investment deferral, better voltage profile, etc. 
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• In Spain, standard loss factors are used. These do not depend on the existence of DG. 
Differences between real losses and standard ones must be purchased at the pool although in 
the future, they will have to be paid by the DSO at the average price of energy. 
• In the Netherlands, the reference level is computed through a benchmarking process, which 
cannot take into account the actual amount of DG in the considered area. 
• In the UK, the reference level is computed based on the historical amount of losses in each 
area. However, the amount of DG is likely to have significantly changed recently.  
• In Denmark, the reference level does not take into account the existence of DG, but the 
existence of DG affects the market energy price level which is considered to compute the 
allowed remuneration. 
In Germany, the DSOs are not encouraged to reduce losses and their remuneration is not affected by 
the existence of DG. The information from the own survey has been supplemented through 
questionnaires answered by parties in countries in the context of the SOLID-DER project [8]. 
Previously, the Netherlands had implemented a rule that passed-through the general beneficial effect of 
DG on network losses. DG generators were paid a small compensation fee. However, a court ruling 
later deemed this part of regulation as insufficiently founded in current Dutch electricity law and the 
regulation was removed. No new initiatives have been taken up by the regulatory authority since. 
2.6.2 Impact on DG/RES operator 
The impact on DG/RES of allowing them to keep some of the benefits they produce is obvious. This 
would encourage them to install more power. However, not all the benefits resulting from integration 
of DG/RES should be kept by DG operators. Otherwise, DSOs will not be encouraged to facilitate their 
connection and integration in system operation. Thus, DSOs should also keep part of these extra 
revenues. Due to the fact that benefits for the system generally depend on the zone where the DG is 
located, this mechanism would act as a locational signal to new DG that would help increase their 
contribution to the efficiency in the operation of the system. Those areas where the system would 
benefit to a larger extent from the existence of DG would also be the ones where revenues for DG are 
larger. Hence, the interest of DG promoters would be in line with that of the system as a whole. 
2.6.3 Impact on DSO 
The impact of DG/RES generation on the DSO costs must be taken into account to compute its allowed 
remuneration. In order to encourage DSOs to reduce costs (increase their efficiency), a reference level 
of costs should be computed. Allowed revenues should be equal to the reference costs. Any difference 
between these allowed revenues and actual costs should be kept by the DSO. The reference level of 
costs should be adapted to the specific situation of the distribution area served by the DSO. Therefore, 
a network reference model, which is able to compute the level of costs that would be incurred by an 
efficient DSO in the same area, should be employed to compute the allowed revenues of DSOs. This 
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model could estimate reasonable CAPEX, OPEX and losses costs. It is important that the DSO still 
finds it attractive to connect and integrate new DG. Therefore, cost increases/decreases brought about 
by DG/RES generation should be considered in the following manner: 
• Increases in costs due to DG/RES generation should result in the same increase in DSO 
revenues. 
• However, reductions in costs caused by DG/RES should result in a reduction of DSO’s 
revenues that is smaller than the former one. Therefore, DSOs should benefit from the 
efficiency increases caused by the integration of DG. 
2.6.4 Regulatory implications 
Part of the recommendations have already been given, or at least outlined, in the two previous 
subsections (2.6.3 and 2.6.4). Therefore, we shall comment on them here. Regulatory authorities should 
implement a system whereby both DSOs and DG keep some of the benefits brought about by the 
installation and the integration into the operation of DG/RES. This system could have the features 
described in section 2.6.4. Cost increases/decreases brought about by DG/RES generation should be 
considered in the following manner: 
• Increases in distribution network costs due to DG/RES generation should result in the same 
increase in DSO allowed revenues. 
• However, reductions in costs caused by DG/RES should result in a reduction of DSO’s 
revenues that is smaller than the former one. Therefore, DSOs should benefit from the 
efficiency increases caused by the integration of DG. 
In order for revenues related to the increase in the social benefit produced by DG to represent powerful 
locational signals for these generators, total revenues from DG should not be socialized to all 
distributed generators in the system. Instead, prices earned by DG in each area, or benefits obtained by 
DG in each area should be specific to the area. 
2.7 Planning of grid expansion with regard to DG/RES 
DG/RES generation may allow DSOs to deter or even avoid undertaking certain reinforcements to the 
grid. In order for this to come true, two main options exist: 
• Either DSOs are allowed to own DG that they can control and use in order to avoid or delay 
network expansions, or 
• DSOs are allowed to sign contracts with controllable, non-intermittent DG/RES generators that 
enable the former to have some control over the output of the latter. Besides, a complete set of 
other active network management techniques would have to be implemented. 
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DG could help to solve overload or voltage regulation problems that otherwise would require building 
network reinforcements that may end up being much more costly than the cost of regulating the output 
of generators at specific times. 
If DSOs receive part of the reduction in network investment costs caused by the installation and 
subsequent operation of DG/RES generation, the former would be encouraged to promote the 
installation of generators and plan the expansion of the grid taking them into account. Implementing a 
system of economic incentives to the DSO is necessary in this respect. 
2.7.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
Central elements of EU legislation are that possible positive effects of demand-side coordination or DG 
integration need to be taken into account when planning investments ([12], Art. 14(7)). The role of 
distributed energy is also mentioned in the context of security of supply and infrastructure investment 
([14], Art. 3(3)). 
In order for DG to be able to deter or delay possible future network investments, it is necessary for the 
DSOs to make sure that DG will be producing/not producing when it is required by the system. Thus, 
some level of controllability of the output of DG by DSOs is necessary. DSOs in Denmark and the UK 
can sign contracts with DG/RES generators. This allows the former to partially control the output of the 
latter. Regulation in other countries does not consider this possibility. 
The remuneration of DSOs in all the considered countries but Germany provides incentives for them to 
cut costs through the use of some form of revenue cap regulation (2007 status). In Spain, a formula is 
applied to compute the revenue cap, while in the Netherlands, a benchmarking process is conducted for 
this purpose. The remuneration obtained by the DSOs in the UK for the new network augmentations is 
the result of a negotiation process between each of these companies and the regulator. The 
remuneration scheme to be applied in Germany in the future will provide efficiency incentives. Thus, if 
DSOs in almost all these countries can control, to some extent, the output of generators, they will use 
this as a mean to reduce investment needs in the system network.  
Active network management techniques have not been implemented in any of these countries. In 
addition, as explained in section 4, the cost increase/reduction caused by DG/RES generation is not 
correctly computed in most systems (all but, maybe, Denmark and the UK). Even where DG costs are 
considered, it is no clear whether the method employed to compute them is efficient. 
As a result of all this, DSOs in most countries do not consider the possibility of avoiding network 
reinforcements because of the presence of DG. Moreover, there are some countries, like the 
Netherlands, where DSOs have traditionally considered DG to be a potential source of problems. An 
exception to this rule is the UK, where DSOs seem to be encouraged to take DG into account in the 
planning process. DSOs in Denmark should also take them into account although most DG is installed 
in remote rural sparsely populated areas, where its potential to avoid network reinforcements is very 
small. 
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Given the lack of incentives for DG in some countries, like the Netherlands and Spain, to provide any 
kind of service to the system, DSOs tend not to consider DG as a potential resource to solve network 
expansion problems. The information from the own survey has been supplemented through 
questionnaires answered by parties in countries in the context of the SOLID-DER project [8]. 
2.7.2 Impact on DG/RES 
DG could be encouraged to cooperate with DSOs in order to reduce flows and solve network operation 
problems by receiving at least part of the value for the system of the services they provide. In this case, 
DSOs would be encouraged to take them into account when planning the expansion of the grid. Getting 
the permission to connect to the grid and to start operation would be much easier for DG/RES 
promoters. 
However, energy market revenues of DG/RES could be negatively impacted by cooperation with the 
DSO, since instructions by the DSO, or the requirement to be available to follow these instructions, 
would most probably condition the operation of these units. This impact would probably be not so 
significant, since, in many cases, when following the instructions of the DSO, DG/RES would be 
compelled to produce extra power when the generation margin over demand in the whole system is 
tight. In other words, DG would be told to increase production when prices are higher. Provision of 
regulation reserves by DG could have a larger impact, since these would limit the production by DG. 
Therefore, DG should only provide these reserves when other potential sources of these reserves are 
not available.  
2.7.3 Impact on DSOs 
Allowing the integration of DG/RES in the network planning process conducted by DSOs would allow 
DSOs to reduce the network investment costs incurred. If DSOs were allowed to retain part of the 
benefits corresponding to the reduction in network expansion costs, they would be encouraged to enter 
into some kind of agreements with DG/RES units. However, in order for DG to be integrated into 
network expansion planning, these generators should be controllable by DSOs. Thus, ANM techniques 
should be implemented. The paradigm of operation of the grid by DSOs should move from the 
traditional passive approach to an active one. This would require a large amount of investments and a 
change in the operation practices, which would represent a significant cost for DSOs.  
2.7.4 Regulatory recommendations 
In order to allow DG to positively affect network development costs, this generation must become, at 
least, partially controllable by the DSO. Therefore, besides the participation of DG/RES generators in 
other kind of markets, DSOs should have the possibility to sign contracts with them so that the 
distribution company can ask them to increase or decrease their production when the system needs it. 
The impact of DG on system expansion cost will be higher the higher the level of controllability of the 
network by the DSO is. Additionally, in those systems where integration between the DSO and DG has 
proved (or is deemed) not to cause discrimination problems, DSOs should allow to own DG whose 
output it can control according to the system needs.  
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The remuneration scheme of DSOs must provide them with incentives to reduce network expansion 
costs. We recommend the use of network reference models to guide the computation by the regulator of 
the regulated revenues of distribution companies. As discussed in section 4, these models, or any other 
tool or method used to compute DSOs’ remuneration level, should take into account the increase or 
decrease in the network costs caused by DG, but should allow DSOs to appropriate part of the 
reduction in costs related to the presence and efficient operation of these generators. 
2.8 Impact of DG/RES generation on the quality of service 
The quality of service level in a system can be computed in terms of the number and duration of 
interruptions of electricity supply both over the whole system (average levels) and for each consumer. 
DG may be a source of flexibility in the operation of the system employed by DSOs to improve quality 
of service levels. However, if DG does not cooperate with the DSO and TSO, they may become a 
source of problems for the system. 
In order for DG to contribute to improving the quality of service a number of conditions must be 
fulfilled: 
• Regulation should encourage the DSO to adapt quality of service levels to consumer demand, 
i.e., willingness to pay. 
• DG must be controllable. 
• The level of control of DSOs over DG must be high enough. 
• Providing AS must be an attractive option for, at least, part of these generators. 
Having distributed generators contribute to increase the quality of service is costly both in terms of 
required technology changes (DG controllability), and in terms of the decrease in operation efficiency 
resulting from the change in the operation profile of these generators (that would no longer operate at 
their nominal rate). Therefore, benefits from their participation in AS markets and other services to 
increase quality of service should be weighed against these costs. 
2.8.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
The Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and Spain have implemented incentives for the DSO to increase 
the quality of service. In the Netherlands, the remuneration of DSOs may vary by up to 10% depending 
on the level of service quality delivered (+-5% with respect to the reference remuneration level). Also, 
DSOs must compensate those consumers who experience service interruptions. In Denmark incentives 
associated with the quality of service have been used for almost 1 year. The reference quality of service 
level is determined through a benchmarking process. In the UK, a reference level is computed as well. 
If the DSO delivers a higher quality level it gets some extra payments. If the quality level is below the 
standard it faces penalties. Since the approval of piece of legislation RD 222/2008, the regulation in 
place in Spain is quite similar to that applied in the UK. Germany has not implemented yet quality of 
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service incentives, but soon quality targets will be established and penalties for not complying with 
them applied (a system similar to the Spanish one).   
However, DSOs in the Netherlands, Germany and Spain do not regard DG as an alternative to improve 
the quality of service, but rather as a potential source of problems. This may be related to the fact that 
the level of controllability of DG by DSOs in these countries is very small because the latter cannot 
sign contracts with these generators. On the other hand, DSOs in Denmark and the UK have the 
possibility of signing ad-hoc contracts with generators. Despite this, Danish DSOs believe that the 
potential impact of DG on quality of service levels is only marginal, since they are located in areas 
where load density is rather low. One additional obstacle to DG significantly contributing to improve 
the quality of service lies in the fact that in some systems like the Spanish or the Dutch ones, energy 
prices earned by these generators are so high that their single objective is producing as much power as 
possible, regardless of the system conditions. The information from the own survey has been 
supplemented through questionnaires answered by parties in the different countries in the context of the 
SOLID-DER project [8]. 
2.8.2 Impact on DSOs and DG 
Probably, if part of the potential benefits brought about by DG in terms of quality of service were 
considered in DSOs’ revenues, they would consider the possibility of connecting more DG and 
interacting with it in order to reduce supply interruptions. Implementing DG controllability and 
realizing the potential for increase in quality of service would probably require using ANM techniques. 
DG/RES could also keep part of the benefits caused by their contribution to quality of service levels for 
themselves. The analysis is quite similar to that conducted under subsection 2.7.  
2.8.3 Regulatory implications 
Quality of service targets must be set for the distribution activity. Additionally, in order for the DSOs 
to aim to improve the existing quality levels, both bonuses and penalties should be applied depending 
on whether the current level is above or below the predetermined target. 
Unless existing storage capacity allows the system not to waste available renewable primary energy, 
intermittent technologies like wind or solar, should be encouraged to produce as much as possible as 
long as there are other ways to keep quality of service levels within the prescribed limits. Only if 
emergency situations should these generators be forced to comply with TSO/DSO instructions. 
Conventional DG generation could be controlled by the operator or contribute to the provision of AS 
on a more regular basis.  
Regulation should allow DSOs to sign contracts with generators so that the former can regulate the 
output of the latter whenever it is truly necessary for the system. This may change the perception of 
distribution companies about the potential contribution of DG to improve quality levels. Additionally, 
the implementation of active network management techniques by DSOs should be rewarded somehow. 
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Finally, prices earned by DG for the energy they produce and those earned for participating in AS 
markets should be efficiently computed so that they correspond to the true value that each of these 
services has for the system. However, in “force majeure” situations, DG should be forced to comply 
with the requests made by the DSO so as to preserve the safe and reliable functioning of the system. 
2.9 Incentives for innovation 
Some major benefits that the system (and the DSO) can obtain from the installation of DG cannot 
materialise unless active network management techniques are implemented by DSOs. This requires 
investing heavily in innovation. However, innovation investments tend to be large in scale and risky, 
which makes it difficult for DSOs to undertake them under present conditions. 
Therefore, DSOs should be provided with incentives for introducing innovative planning and operation 
procedures. These incentives may be of three types: 
• Innovation expenditures by DSOs may be reimbursed. Other measures could be taken so that 
risk premiums paid by investors in innovative projects are reduced. 
• The regulator or in general government funded agencies may cooperate with the DSOs in the 
design and implementation of innovative processes. 
• Strengthening those efficiency incentives that are related to those parameters that can only 
improve through investments in innovation. 
The largest share of innovation investments is expected to benefit DG/RES integration because they 
need the development to a pro-active network operator providing more communication infrastructure. 
Distribution system operations have been rather constant during the last decades and DSOs are 
expected to cope better with new challenges if they approach them actively, i.e., through innovation 
projects. 
2.9.1 Review of the existing relevant regulation 
Incentives for innovation vary across countries. In Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK DSOs 
are encouraged to cut costs. Innovation investments may result in cost reductions in the long term 
future, but these are uncertain. The short term impact of innovation investments in the balance sheet of 
these companies is likely to be negative, since investments of this type tend to be large. On the other 
hand, quality of service incentives applied in those systems should encourage DSOs to invest in order 
to improve quality indexes. 
The Spanish regulator has bowed to strengthen incentives to undertake efficient investments, reduce 
losses and increase quality levels. The present situation in the Netherlands is similar to that in Spain. 
Even more, due to the system of yardstick competition in place there to determine the remuneration of 
DSOs, these are discouraged to undertake innovations that can be replicated by the remaining 
companies causing a reduction in the reference level of costs incurred by these companies. Parties in 
Denmark are in favour of allowing DG to participate in balancing markets so that DSOs have a larger 
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incentive to integrate this generation. In the UK economic support is granted to those DSOs that invest 
in the improvement of grid expansion, operation and maintenance processes (IFI support scheme). 
There are also incentives for facilitating the connection of DG/RES generators.  
Finally, Germany is an exception to the general rule, since no incentives have been implemented yet. 
Also, there is the belief that incentives to innovation would only favour the integration of large DG. 
Smaller ones would have to be aggregated in order to become units that can contribute to improving the 
functioning of the system. 
2.9.2 Impact on DSO/DG 
Innovation would allow the application of ANM, which would be beneficial to both DSOs and 
DG/RES operators if they are allowed to keep part of the benefits brought about by a more efficient 
proactive operation of the system grid. Costs incurred by DSOs (mainly) and by DG when devising 
more advanced solutions for cooperation would be high. In order to reduce them, applying incentives 
would be necessary. These incentives would reduce the risk perceived by DG and DSOs when 
undertaking investment in innovation. Besides, they would allow them to reduce the expected cost of 
innovating. 
2.9.3 Regulatory implications 
In general, innovations are expected to support the development of a conventional, “passive” DSO to 
an “active” DSO considerably. This would benefit DG/RES integration. Innovation incentives could be 
associated with the reduction of grid expansion and operation costs (energy price and losses) and the 
increase of service quality levels. Since these investments are large and risky, the regulator should 
provide financial support in the first stages of the innovation process until the benefits resulting from 
the introduction of these innovations become clear. This support could adopt the form of research funds 
granted by the government for companies to develop innovative proposals. 
The level of controllability of DG by DSOs should be increased and the contribution of the former to 
AS should be allowed as long as it is feasible. This must make the integration of DG more attractive to 
DSOs, provided distribution companies seek to improve the functioning of the system through 
investments in innovation. 
Finally, the remuneration scheme of DSOs should provide them with incentives to reduce losses, 
increase quality levels and reduce investment capital costs through the control of these distributed 
generators. Besides, cost cuts achieved through innovation should not immediately result in a decrease 
of allowed DSOs’ revenues. Therefore, the reference level of DSOs’ revenues should not be updated, to 
take into account cost reductions brought about by innovation, until some time (several years) have 
passed from the implementation of these innovative solutions.  
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3. Revenue stream model 
DG operators are usually subsidised, and DSOs are widely regulated. These are major characteristics 
that impact the underlying incentives for the market behaviour of DG generators and DSOs. 
Interactions between support schemes, network revenue regulation and regulation of connection 
charges/UoS charges affect the choices of DG and DSO both in their short term optimisation and in 
their longer term investment decisions. It is very important to secure that the incentive effects of these 
three regulation elements do not counteract each other. 
A revenue stream model that takes all these interrelated elements into account would be very complex. 
The focus in this chapter has been put on emphasising the important links that exist, based on assessing 
the individual revenue stream components regarding their importance and their most likely net 
contribution. Analysing these interactions should enable to investigate if there are ways to secure that 
the right incentives are passed to the DG and DSO investors to minimise the combined costs elements. 
If the regulation has different properties for allowing the incentives to be passed, the most efficient 
regulation should be identified. 
3.1 Background 
As pointed out earlier, liberalisation entails the unbundling of traditionally vertically integrated 
undertakings and the introduction of competition in electricity generation and supply (Directive 
2003/54/EC). Notwithstanding the opening up of markets to third parties, certain areas continue to be 
subject to regulation. First, networks for the transmission and distribution of power have natural 
monopoly characteristics. A natural monopoly exists6 when the firm’s costs are sub-additive, i.e., when 
it is less costly to supply output with a single firm rather than splitting up production between several 
competing firms, and when there are economies of scale over some range of production [28]. Networks 
exhibit the attributes of essential facilities: they cannot be replicated by any reasonable means by 
competitors, and access to the facility is indispensable [42] for market entry. For these reasons, also in 
liberalised markets, the income of network companies remains regulated. In the EU Member States, the 
predominant regulatory approaches comprise cost-of-service regulation, revenue/price cap incentive 
regulation and yardstick regulation. Second, certain generation technologies, such as those deploying 
renewable energy sources, contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and to the 
enhancement security of supply. Due to the high investment cost associated with RES-E installations 
and the fact that externalities are not captured by the market, fossil fuels are at an artificial advantage. 
This has been a rationale for encouraging the application of support schemes in the generation segment 
so as to promote  electricity produced from renewable energy sources (Directive 2001/77/EC) and 
combined heat and power (Directive 2004/8/EC). 
These types of regulatory framework influence directly the decomposition of costs and revenue of all 
market actors, here in particular of DG operators and DSOs. This section seeks to schematically 
investigate the impact of DG/RES integration on the main cost and benefit streams of DG/RES 
                                                 
6 based on its technological definition. 
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operators and DSOs. The focus of this section is to illustrate the effects arising from the interactions of 
different connection charging, network regulation and support schemes. This in turn influences the 
underlying incentives of market actors. 
3.2 Cost and Revenue Streams of DG Operators and the DSO 
Both for the DG operator and for the DSO, cost and revenue can be differentiated into capital 
expenses/income to be paid/received upfront and operational expenses/income to be paid or received as 
a variable component during operation of the plant. Notably, some of the expenses and income 
components are incurred either by the DG operator or by the DSO only whereas other components are 
passed through or allocated among them and other market actors, e.g., the TSO and consumers. The 
allocation of cost and revenue components impacts the risk exposure of the individual market actors. 
The main sources of revenue for a DG operator are the national support schemes, provided the DG 
operator’s eligibility, and/or the power price formed on the wholesale electricity market. Support 
schemes comprise investment support, i.e., capital grants, tax exemptions or reductions on the purchase 
of goods [5], and operating support, such as feed-in tariffs, tradable green certificate schemes and fiscal 
incentives (Table 8). Depending on the type of support, it may either be received upfront (investment 
support) or during the time of operation of the DG unit (operational support). The support instruments 
are for the most part granted on the basis of technologies, sometimes further differentiated according to 
capacity size. Frequently, Member States apply a combination of different support schemes and support 
levels across technologies. In terms of capital income, in addition to investment support subject to 
national regulation, DSOs may provide locational signals by means of an upfront locational premium 
so as to induce DG operators to site new plants optimally from a network point of view. 
The decomposition of variable income depends highly on the support scheme the DG operator is 
entitled to. Under the traditional feed-in tariff scheme, the price received by the DG operator per 
kilowatt-hour is fixed by the regulator and guaranteed for a specific duration, e.g., of 20 years. This 
means that the DG operator is not subject to wholesale price volatility and market forces, in particular, 
if the feed-in tariff is combined with priority access to the grid. In the case of a price premium, 
frequently applied as a technology becomes more mature and reaches higher levels of market 
penetration, a premium is paid on top of the wholesale market price. Additionally, DG operators often 
receive a fixed contribution per kWh for balancing costs. This induces DG operators to adapt their 
production more to fluctuations in market prices and demand, but also exposes them to a higher degree 
of price volatility on the wholesale market. A quota system with tradable green certificates is based on 
the opposite approach as compared to price-based mechanisms: the regulator determines a renewable 
energy target to be achieved as a percentage share of total electricity production. When selling power 
based on renewable energy sources, DG/RES operators receive a corresponding amount of green 
certificates that can then be traded on a green certificate market. In this regime, DG operators are 
exposed to both the volatility of the wholesale market power price and of the green certificate price 
formed on the certificate market. Further variable income may be obtained by means of a system 
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service bonus for the provision of grid-stabilizing system services. Another consideration is 
congestion-related pricing which ensures a higher compatibility with network operation [25]. 
In analogy to the decomposition of revenue, the costs of the DG operator can be subdivided into capital 
expenses (CAPEX) and operational expenses (OPEX). CAPEX include the investment costs for the 
plant, equipment and possibly ground, a risk premium and connection charges. The DG operator incurs 
the latter for obtaining the connection to the network. The upfront capital investment is the highest in 
the case of a deep charging regime, where the DG operator has to pay both for grid reinforcements at 
the distribution and at the transmission level. A shallow charging approach only encompasses the direct 
cost of connection, i.e., the cost for new service lines to an existing network point [1]. Typically, costs 
for network upgrades are then recuperated through generator Use of System charges as a variable cost 
component, or socialized among users over time. Operational costs comprise fuel costs (if a fuel is 
required for operation of the plant), operation and maintenance costs (O&M), and the network tariff 
paid to the DSO for transport and system services. 
Table 8: Cost and revenue of DG operator 
 Calculated expenses (cost) Calculated income (revenue) 
 
Capital 
(Upfront) 
- Investment costs (plant, equipment, 
ground) 
- Deep/shallow(ish) connection 
charges 
- Depreciation costs 
- Remuneration of debt and equity 
 
- Investment support (capital grants, 
fiscal incentives, price reductions on 
purchase of goods) 
- Upfront locational premium  
 
Operational 
(Variable) 
- Fuel costs 
- Plant operation and maintenance 
- Other costs (staff, etc.) 
 
- Network tariff (generator use of 
system charges and other tariff 
components) 
- Operating support (feed-in tariff, price 
premium, green certificate price, tender, 
fiscal incentives) 
- Power price 
- System service bonus 
 
 
 
 
As for the DSO, the revenue consists primarily of the network tariff subject to national regulation. In 
the case of deep connection charges, the DSO is able to recuperate all costs for network reinforcements, 
both at the transmission and distribution level, upfront from the DG operator. The operational revenue 
comprises generator and consumer Use of System charges as well as other network tariff components. 
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Table 9: Cost and Revenue of the DSO 
 Calculated expenses (cost) Calculated income (revenue) 
 
Capital 
(Upfront) 
- Costs for reinforcements 
- Costs for network extensions 
- Costs for direct line of connection for 
new plant (transformers, cables, etc.) 
- risk premium for stranded 
investments 
 
- Depreciation costs 
- Remuneration of debt and equity 
 
- Deep/shallow(ish) connection charges 
 
 
Operational 
(Variable) 
- Network operation & maintenance 
- Transmission use of system charges 
- Costs incurred due to losses 
 
- Ancillary service cost 
- Use of system charges (generators and 
network users) 
- Other network tariff components, e.g., 
energy charges (rewarded per kWh), 
capacity charges 
 
 
 
In terms of expenditures, as part of the DG-GRID project, Joode et al. [27] provide an overview of the 
expenditures incurred by DSOs: CAPEX consist of investments in distribution network assets, and the 
associated depreciation costs and remuneration of debt and equity. OPEX cover costs for using the 
transmission network (transmission Use of System charges), distribution losses, costs of ancillary 
services, costs for operation and maintenance, and possibly commercial costs in relation to energy 
management and billing of final customers. 
3.3 Regulation Interactions and the impact on DG 
In order to examine the impact of DG/RES integration on the main cost and benefit streams of DG/RES 
operators and DSOs, it is fundamentally important to distinguish 
- Exogenous and endogenous components of their cost and revenue streams, that is, which 
components are fixed (e.g., feed-in tariff) or regulated (methodology for determination of 
access charge), and which components are subject to market forces, thereby implying a higher 
degree of investment uncertainty? 
- The allocation of costs, i.e., are the costs appropriated by the DSO or DG/RES operator 
directly, or are they passed through to other market actors? 
There are, as shown above, three types of government interventions in the market forces that shape the 
interaction between DG and DSOs: 
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1. Support scheme for DG  → DG  
 
2. Regulatory regime for DSO prices or revenue at aggregate level  → DSO 
 
3. Regulated charges (grid codes) for connection of DG and UoS charges for DG generation 
      → DG + DSO 
 
The choice of support scheme affects DG revenues and incentives directly. Simultaneously, it affects 
DSOs by the volume of DG investments. However, the DSO can only to a very limited extend respond 
to changes in the general level of DG subsidy to affect the DG investment level. Furthermore, there is 
only very limited difference between the subsidy regimes from the DSO point of view as long as they 
provide the same aggregate DG investment. Therefore, the conclusion is that the subsidy regime affects 
the DG but not the DSO, the latter being only affected by the general level of DG subsidy. 
 
The regulatory regime affects the DSO directly in terms of prices (UoS charges) or the revenue. 
However, as this is the aggregate regulated price for all users on the DSO grid, it will not affect the DG 
generator very much as such. For the DG generator, it is crucial which specific charges it has to pay 
relative to the average charges incurred by all users. However, there might be specific details about the 
inclusion of DG related (public priority) reinforcements costs in the capital base (for allowed revenue) 
used for the DSO regulation. In general, the conclusion is that the specific choice of network company 
regulation does not affect the DG generator. 
Contrary to these two points mentioned above, the regulation implemented in grid codes etc. for the 
connection of DG units and the UoS charges they have to pay have considerable impact on both DG 
generators and DSOs. This is the important channel for transfers of incentives. It is thus vital not to 
block this channel by inefficient regulation. 
3.3.1 Support Schemes 
Depending on the support scheme in place, DG/RES operators face different degrees of exposure to the 
volatility of market prices: 
• Feed-in tariff: under the traditional feed-in tariff regime, DG/RES operators a feed-in tariff, T , 
preset by the regulator. T  constitutes an exogenous variable. The only uncertainty that may 
persist is on changes in tariff levels and/or the regulatory regime. However, there is no direct 
exposure to price volatility on the market. Feed-in tariffs are frequently socialized among all 
electricity consumers, or financed through cross-subsidization by means of taxes. 
• Price premium: if a price premium is applied, DG/RES generators obtain the electricity price, 
Ep , formed on the wholesale electricity market, and a fixed price premium, s , on top of the 
market price. The price premium is fixed (exogenous variable) whereas Ep  is endogenously 
determined on the market. In some Member States (e.g., Denmark) for some technologies, an 
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upper ceiling exists, that is, the sum of the electricity price and the price premium may not 
exceed a certain limit. 
• Quota system with tradable green certificates: this scheme leaves the allocation to market 
forces; only the quantity of electricity produced from renewable energy sources is preset. 
DG/RES operators obtain the power price, Ep , and the certificate price, Cp , the latter being 
determined on the certificate market. Both variables are endogenously determined. The green 
quota can be imposed on retailers, electricity consumers or on power generators, i.e., the 
obligation can be on the production or on the consumer side [40]. 
 
Figure 1 schematically summarises the major regulatory interactions of DG and DSO revenue streams. 
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Figure 1: Major regulatory interactions of DG and DSO revenue streams 
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3.3.2 Support Scheme Revenue Calculation Schemes 
The profit of a representative DG operator consists of his revenue, depending on the application of 
national support schemes, and of the costs incurred for network connection and usage, plant operation 
and maintenance, fuel, etc. (Table 8). The main focus here is to illustrate the implications of different 
support schemes on the profit of DG operators. This section therefore abstracts from the detailed 
decomposition of investment and variable costs, which depend to a high a degree on the technological 
characteristics and network impact of a DG unit. Instead, emphasis is set on the extent to which prices 
are subject to market forces and hence endogenously determined, as opposed to being fixed by the 
regulator.  
First, under a feed-in tariff scheme (case 1), a simplified representation of the profit function of the 
DG operator over the lifetime of a plant can be given by 
( ) ( )var
1
t
DG DG t DG DG
i
q T c UoS q CC Iπ
=
= − − − −∑ . 
Due to its small size, it can be assumed that the DG operator constitutes a marginal installation, i.e., the 
production quantity q of the single DG operator does not exert significant influence on the market 
price7. In this simple representation, the DG operator maximizes profit by setting the production 
quantity qt in each period8. The profit, πDG, which the DG operator generates over the sum of its 
operation periods t can be decomposed into revenue, in this case in the form of a fixed feed-in tariff T 
obtained for each kWh of renewable electricity fed into the system, and costs. The latter comprise 
variable costs for the DG plant, cvar, UoS charges, UoSDG, connection charges, CCDG, and initial 
investment cost for plant and equipment, IDG. Variable costs for the DG plant comprise costs for 
operation and maintenance, staff, and possibly fuel cost, amongst others. UoS charges are equally 
incurred per kWh and have to be paid by the DG operator if generator UoS charges are applied. In 
contrast to these variable costs (note that they are multiplied with the quantity of power generated, q), 
connection charges and investment costs for the plant are to be paid up front. The feed-in tariff is preset 
so that it constitutes an exogenously given parameter in the DG operator’s revenue function. 
In comparison, under a price premium scheme (case 2), the decomposition of revenue changes: 
( ) ( )var
1
t
DG E DG DG t DG DG
i
q p s c UoS q CC Iπ
=
= + − − − −∑ % . 
In this case, the DG operator receives the power price Ep% , which is endogenously determined on the 
power market. This implies that only the price premium DGs  constitutes a fixed component of the DG 
operator’s revenue whereas under the traditional feed-in tariff scheme this applied to the entire revenue. 
                                                 
7 Naturally, with higher penetration levels of DG, this changes. 
8 Again, this being a simplified representation, we neglect the aspects of controllability and natural/operation variability of 
some RES and CHP technologies. 
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Under a quota system with tradable green certificates, the exposure to price volatility on markets is 
even more pronounced: 
( ) ( )var
1
t
DG E C DG t DG DG
i
q p p c UoS q CC Iπ
=
= + − − − −∑ % % . 
Now there is no more fixed parameter in the revenue decomposition of the DG operator since the 
certificate price, Cp% , is formed on the certificate market. 
Theoretically speaking, ceteris paribus, the revenue of the DG operator would be identical for all three 
support schemes if the feed-in tariff (case 1) was equal to the endogenously determined electricity price 
plus the price premium (case 2), and to the sum of the power price and the green certificate price (case 
3) under the assumption of perfectly functioning markets. From a practical viewpoint, though, inherent 
to the volatility of prices, investment certainty for DG/RES operators is the highest under a feed-in 
tariff scheme. If the impact on DG and DSO from support schemes are to be compared it must be based 
on the same assumption of the penetration that the support schemes will lead to. For the same levels of 
aggregate penetration, the concentration (location) of the new DG investment will be identical for the 
first three support schemes as they are production dependent. An investment subsidy makes the DG 
lifetime revenue less production dependent and therefore the location will tend to be more spread out in 
different DSO grids. This is preferable to the DSO but not necessarily from the overall efficiency 
perspective.  
Table 10: Risk effect and support scheme preferences 
 DG  DSO 
Fixed level FIT  prefer no effect 
Feed-in premium increased variation no effect 
Feed in premium and Tradable green certificates  high income variation no effect 
Investment subsidy prefer prefer 
  
The impact on the DSO is relatively limited due to the small impact on the DG decision where to locate 
their plant (investment) given that a certain level of investment is obtained by the scheme. 
 
The general effect of the different risk perception for the DG is that it affects the level of investment, 
but this can be neutralized by adjusting the subsidy element in each of the schemes. Again, this does 
not affect the DSO. The reason for the DSO preferring the investment subsidy is the more diverse 
location of DG investment, due to the weaker link between generation and subsidy.  
3.3.3 DG profits and participation in two markets under different support 
schemes 
The risk impact on the relative preference for support scheme resulted in a DG preference for fixed 
feed-in tariffs. If the option for trading on different markets is introduced, this result might change. 
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The support scheme will influence the optimising behaviour of the DG in the way that it optimises its 
supply of the exogenous generation on the two markets. The more market based the subsidy scheme is, 
the more will the optimization be influenced by price differentials.  
 
Indirectly this will influence the location of DG if there is any cost effect of having larger generation 
fluctuations, but we will leave this consideration to the end.   
To illustrate this relation, a simple model of DG optimisation over two markets under different support 
schemes is sketched here. 
Revenue for the DG with a feed in premium P and two markets consist of revenue from  
 
• a day-ahead type spot market S 
• and a regulating market R. 
 
In the fixed feed-in tariff regime, the revenue will be independent on the access to the two different 
markets: 
*
DGR q T= . 
 
In the premium subsidy scheme, the revenue is depending on the prices on the two markets and the 
share α which is supplied on the regulating market: 
* * *( ) (1 )DG R SR q P q p q pα α= + + − . 
 
In both regimes the costs are the same, variable costs + connection charges (annualised) + investment 
costs (annualised), as given by: 
( )* *DG v DG DGC q c q CC I= + + . 
 
Total generation q* is exogenous and equal to qS + qR; this could be interpreted as limited capacity or 
limited fuel resource. Revenue is based on revenue from the two markets and the feed in premium P. 
The premium is earned independent on which market the power is supplied to. That means no premium 
is lost for the generator.  
Costs are identical in the two support schemes. The costs per unit are constant which means that output 
will be maximized as long as feed-in or feed-in premium plus market price exceeds the total average 
costs. Investment will only be undertaken in this case and generation set at the exogenous maximum. 
For a single DG unit this description is reasonable.    
In the feed-in regime, all the generation will be supplied on the spot market as there are no incentives to 
get involved in trading on the regulating market. 
In the premium subsidy scheme, there is an incentive to supply the generation on the market which is 
most profitable. If the price on the regulating market is higher than the price on the spot market, all 
generation will be supplied on the regulating market in case of the premium scheme. However, the 
premium could be adjusted to make the DG generator indifferent relative to the fixed feed-in case. 
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In a more realistic setup, the price on the regulating market has to be somewhat higher to compensate 
for the DG following the stricter rules for trading here (which implies higher transaction costs).  Now if 
the price on the spot market is varying through time, but still providing the same average price that 
would leave the DG just as well off as under the fixed feed-in regime, the DG will face price 
differentials that are favouring supply on the regulating market when spot prices are low. 
For these hours the DG will potentially earn less than under the fixed feed-in tariff system, but 
considerably more than if the output could only be supplied on the spot market. 
So even if the spot market price average  and the premium corresponds exactly to the fixed feed-in 
tariff, then the profit for DG will be higher under a the premium plus flexible market participation.  
 
* * *( ) (1 )
t t tDG t t R t S
R q P q p q pα α= + + −  
 
The suffix t denotes the time periods during an average year where prices on the two markets vary. In 
an example with total generation spread over three intervals with different relative price levels, the two 
subsidy regimes would produce different results.  
 
( ) 3* * *
1
( ) (1 )
t tDG t t t R t t S DG DG
t
q P q p q p CC Iπ α α α
=
⎛ ⎞= + + − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
 
The three periods exhibit the following three price relations 
 
t1: p1S = p1R 
t2: p1S > p1R 
t3: p1S < p1R 
 
As q* is exogenous, optimising profits only means setting the three time period alphas at 0 or 1.    
 
1
* * * *
1 2 2 3 3DG S S R DG DGMax q P q p q p q p CC Iπ = + + + − −  
α1 = 0; α2 = 0; α3 = 1 
 
Without the option to switch between the markets, the DG generator would have suffered the low spot 
prices in period three. Allowing the trade on several markets as always allows to optimise the 
allocation of supply. This result is similar to the comparison of fixed feed-in and premium, where the 
generator (DG) is able to switch production not between markets but between different time periods 
with varying prices on the spot market. In the case given here, this is not possible as generation is 
exogenous in each period. This is the main advantage of premium subsidy schemes as compared to a 
fixed feed-in tariff when the (DG) generator is controllable. 
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If the fixed feed-in case is compared to the premium, in our case the average price levels would signal 
that the DG is just as well off under the fixed feed-in as under the premium system, but the DG will due 
to the switching between markets be better off under the premium subsidy regime.  
 
From a societal viewpoint, the two situations imply that the subsidy under the premium system and the 
fixed feed-in tariff regime are the same because the net subsidy in the fixed case is total feed-in minus 
the spot market price. 
Alternatively, the effectiveness of subsidies can be addressed in that the necessary subsidy to provide 
the same profit incentives is lower under the premium regime with broader market access. 
For the DG, now the higher risk (annual variation) in revenue and profits in the premium case (referred 
to earlier) has to be balanced against the possibility of higher profits due to access to regulating markets 
in situations where spot market prices are low. This consideration is not reflected in our simple setting 
here. From a societal perspective, the risk is not relevant, but the contribution to both markets makes 
total adjustment cost for the power system reduced. 
 
Finally, the consequences for DSOs can be considered. There are possible negative and positive effects. 
The variation of generation might become higher, but on the other hand the DG in increasing its own 
monitoring and controllability also might contribute to more precise generation plans and predictability 
in the local grid. The net effect is unclear and as many other factors highly dependent on the local grid 
properties. It is possible that the net effect in many cases will be negligible and therefore the total effect 
will be positive for the costs of the power system.  
3.3.4 The DG revenue and rising connection charges with increasing DG 
share in network  
One of the most important decisions affecting the interrelated costs between DG and DSO is the plant 
location in the specific DSO grid and the distribution of DG investment over different DSO grids. For 
this decision to be efficient one have to consider the appropriate channel for the DSO to affect DG 
location decisions. The operational decisions of DG can also have effects on DSO costs, but these 
effects are considered to be much less important and are excluded from this analysis. 
As the parameters available to the DSO (connection charges and UoS charges) are regulated, they can 
not be set freely. However, there is no symmetry with regard to this as regulation allows the DSO to set 
charges as low as possible. Here, the focus is on a situation where there is a benefit accruing from DG 
in the grid at some locations relative to other locations or relative to other grids. In these cases, the 
DSO is able to provide incentives for DG localisation by reducing (or afterwards providing bonuses) 
for connection charges whatever the state of shallow, shallowish or deep connection charge allows. 
There might be a preference for providing this discount up front relative to the use of more complicated 
discounts on the UoS charges for a specific location.  
 
What is then the origin of the positive impact of a DG installation on DSO costs?  
• Deferred or reduced reinforcement costs (consumer related) 
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• Network losses 
• Reduced faults 
• Reduction of other operating costs for DSO. 
 
For the discussion here, it is assumed that the main potential cost reduction can be attributed to the 
possibility of reduced network losses. These are allowed as increased profits under the DSO regulation 
and thus will contribute also to the long term profits of the DSO.  
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Figure 2: Possible network loss reductions in different grids 
The basic assumption is that network losses are reduced as initially generation is introduced in the grid. 
Gradually, as the share of DG in the grid relative to the load increases, the benefit for losses is reduced. 
At some level, the benefit turns into a loss as aggregate losses increase again.  
 
Compared to network losses, it is assumed that the three other cost elements can be either positive or 
negative. However, this varies highly dependent on the conditions in each distribution grid, and none of 
them have positive contributions on average. They are therefore excluded from the general analysis 
here. 
 
If network losses are reduced by the generation from DG at low levels of penetration and this benefit 
gradually fades away as penetration levels increase, then there is a need to pass this incentive on to the 
DG investor. The optimal investment would be to have different levels of penetration in the different 
grids depending on their characteristics. 
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With cost functions showing increasing costs in the share of DG in a specific DSO grid, investment 
will take place in more grids. As grid cost reduction potentials are exploited in the grid with best 
generation potentials, investment will take place in a grid with slightly less favourable generation 
conditions. The profit maximising DG generator will invest until marginal costs equal the marginal 
revenue of adding capacity. In reality, the revenue will be different in the grids depending on other 
factors, such as the wind conditions, heat demand, or local biomass resources.  Here we assume these 
conditions to be constant so that only connection costs affect marginal costs for the DG. 
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Figure 3: Gradually increased connection charges with increasing DG share 
This figure illustrates how marginal connection charges (net) are related to the accumulated share of 
DG in a specific grid. At a given penetration level, there is no more reduction of losses and if the DG 
share is further increased there will be increased losses. However, this is not passed on to the DG 
generator by means of further increasing connection charges, but capped with the regulated shallow 
connection charge.  
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Figure 4: Long term marginal costs of DG investment in each grid 
 
This figure illustrates that total marginal costs for investment in a given grid is still characterised by the 
same gradual increase in costs, but at a higher level as the constant investment and semi-variable costs 
are included. 
( )DG DG DG
qMax qP q p q CC qI
L
π = + − −  
Profit maximisation implies maximising the premium revenues and the market revenues, which are 
constant per investment with costs increasing in the amount of investment. Costs will be rising up to 
the point where the connection charges are capped. 
 
( ) min( , )DG Shallow
q qCC a CC
L L
α= +  
 
a is the base share of DG and q
L
is the share contribution from new DG investment 
The drawback of this representation is that there is not necessarily a maximum profit. Only if marginal 
revenue for the DG is less than marginal total costs including the capped connection charges, it will 
invest less than corresponding to the share of DG with no more network loss reduction. However, if the 
national level of penetration is as high as the situation with capped connection charges, the support 
element can be reduced. In reality, also the other rising marginal cost elements will secure that 
maximisation does not lead to 100% penetration of DG. 
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3.3.5 Curtailment and DG - DSO costs  
Curtailment costs could serve as costs on marginal DG investment in a grid that needs reinforcement to 
serve peak generation from DG. With this disincentive to invest for the DG, the investment in several 
grids would be secured just as with the previous example of connection cost reductions. However, this 
solution is inefficient in that it provides no incentive for the DSO to invest. If the DSO, on the other 
hand, had to carry the burden of curtailment by compensating fully the generator, the DSO would 
become dependent on the support scheme.  
 
On the negative side of cost interaction, there is a cost element of DSO operation that is dependent on 
the subsidy scheme for DG. If the curtailment cost of generation is to be (partly) borne by the DSO, the 
curtailment cost will be higher if under a fixed feed-in tariff. Under a premium or market + TGC 
scheme the market price will be lower at times of curtailment, and the cost for the DSO of curtailing 
will be lower as well. This is efficient from an economic point as the cost of lost generation is reflected 
in the market price at the given point in time, and not the average. 
 
Curtailment is relevant in grids with high penetration of intermittent distributed generation. In Germany 
the recent changes in legislation have allowed the curtailment based on compensation of the generators. 
In this way, the DSO will have to pay compensation based on either the FIT or a market price. It is not 
evident how the imbalance payments are included in this compensation. 
 
DSO costs for curtailment compensation will not be included in the revenue cap. The DSO will thus 
prefer a situation where the curtailment costs are minimized (market price subsidy regime) which will 
maximize their profits. If fully compensated, the DG will have no incentive to locate the investment to 
grids where this curtailment would not happen. It is also difficult to establish a channel whereby the 
DSO can shift this additional cost to the DG in a proportion that induces both location incentives to the 
DG and grid reinforcement incentives to the DSO. In most cases, some minor level of curtailment will 
be more efficient than overinvesting in grid reinforcements. One possible solution is to include 
curtailment of generation in the quality network regulation.   
 
3.3.6 Network regulation approaches 
The national network regulation sets the framework for the economic operation of a DSO. In the 
following, two topics are distinguished: first, how the total revenue of a DSO is determined. This is 
tantamount to setting average charges because it leaves the question open which customer group pays 
which level of charges. Secondly, possibilities of revenue recuperation among customers are addressed.  
Three main categories of network regulation approaches are distinguished in the scope of this report: 
Rate-of-Return regulation (RoR), revenue cap incentive regulation and yardstick regulation. The 
following short description refers to the respective section in Deliverable D2 of the IMPROGRES 
project. 
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3.3.6.1 Rate-of-Return regulation 
A Rate-of-Return (RoR) regulation is characterised by the fact that the regulator approves a cost 
base. A predefined interest rate is given on the bound capital. There are several practical applications of 
this approach: the regulator can take a rather light approach and control ex-post if the income of the 
regulated firm was reasonable, regarding its cost base and the allowed rate of return. The other 
possibility is that the regulated firm has to account for all costs in detail. The regulator will judge their 
reasonability and allow the predefined rate of return on the bound capital9. The latter approach tries to 
overcome the information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated company with a higher 
administrative effort. It is regarded as the relevant RoR regulatory framework in the scope of this 
project as it reflects current practice in some European countries, e.g., in Germany (until 2008). 
A formula to determine the revenue under a rate-of-return regulation can be as follows (based on [26]): 
Ri ,t = OEi ,t + Di ,t + Ti ,t +(RABi ∗ RoR)t 
The revenue Ri  is composed of the operating expenses OEi, depreciation expenses Di, tax expenses Ti  
and the product of the regulatory asset base RABi  and the allowed rate of return RoRi. 
A common critique to this approach is that there is an incentive to inflate the capital base (Averch-
Johnson-effect) to reach a higher total profit. This means that a substitution of production factors takes 
place: a part of usual operational expenditure (OPEX) is replaced by capital expenditure (CAPEX). 
Both have an impact on the integration of additional DG/RES units; necessary additional investments 
may be welcomed by the DSO, whereas higher OPEX due to DG/RES (e.g., higher losses due to 
location in the network) may be seen critically. In the following, it is assumed that the regulator accepts 
all additional costs due to DG/RES integration and that the DSO knows about this, i.e., does not regard 
DG/RES connections with a risk premium. 
3.3.6.2 Incentive regulation: Revenue and price cap 
Revenue and price cap incentive regulation schemes lead to similar outcomes: the revenue is the 
average price multiplied by the quantity. A cap is commonly announced ex-ante to give the DSO a 
secure planning framework. If quantity deviations and therewith the revenue are adjusted ex-post to the 
actual outcome, both mechanisms are equivalent. This correction should take place because the DSO 
cannot be held responsible for the electricity consumption and generation of its customers. A general 
formula for the calculation of the revenue is (based on [26]): 
Ri,t = (Ri,t-1 + AFi,t) * (1 + RPI – Xgen,i,t  – Xind,i,t) ± Zi,t 
The revenue Ri  is based on the previous year’s revenue Ri,t-1 and exogenous changes are corrected for 
with the adjustment factor AFi,t. This can comprise a change in the number of customers, a change in 
the amount of transmitted energy or network length. Furthermore, it does not have to be symmetrical, 
but can only regard positive changes: a negative development in the number of customers or the 
                                                 
9 This approach is also referred to as Cost-plus-regulation in the literature; cf Viljainen, 2005, p. 16. 
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amount of transmitted kWh will not result in lower depreciations. The next part of the formula takes the 
retail price development RPI into account and sets the efficiencies for single distribution companies: 
Xgen,i,t  is a general efficiency requirement for the whole industry, whereas Xind,i,t  is an individual 
requirement for the single company which is based on a benchmarking with its peers. The final factor 
Zi,t reflects penalties or bonuses for meeting other objectives, e.g., with regard to quality of service 
levels. Notably, structural differences between firms need to be corrected for. 
A core feature of revenue and price cap incentive schemes is the existence of a regulatory period: the X 
factors are set for several years in advance10. This way, the company has an incentive to increase its 
efficiency faster than the X requirements; the difference represents additional profit. 
Several of the aforementioned elements interact with DG/RES units, as the following examples 
illustrate: 
• Does an additional unit count as a new customer and thus increase AFi,t? 
• Does an increasing share of self-generation (i.e., lower transmission through the network) 
impact AFi,t? 
• Does the benchmarking methodology for Xgen,i,t  take DG/RES into account properly, both for 
capital and operating expenses? 
• How are changes in the quality of service level (possibly contained in Zi,t) considered? 
• How are necessary new investments due to DG/RES incorporated in Zi,t? 
• Is it ensured that investments due to DG/RES do not turn into stranded costs when the unit stops 
generating before the part of the grid is fully depreciated?  
In the following, it is assumed that the regulator accounts in principle correctly for the impact of 
DG/RES. From the DSO’s point of view, a risk premium evolves as it cannot be sure that additional 
DG/RES units in comparison to the plan will be included correctly. The risk premium comprises the 
possibility for future changes of the regulatory system as well, reflecting the risk that systematic 
changes might worsen the position of DSOs with a high DG/RES penetration in comparison to those 
with a low one11. 
3.3.6.3 Yardstick regulation 
The third major network income regulation approach is yardstick regulation. The usage of the term 
yardstick regulation evolved over time: the original concept suggests that a firm’s revenue is based on 
the average revenue of all comparable firms [38]. This leads to a high efficiency pressure on firms, 
especially if the yardstick mechanism is applied annually and ex-post. 
                                                 
10 The possibility of ex-post determination is also applied in some countries, but will not be followed in this report. 
11 This risk is symmetrical which means that it could also be a chance; as self-generation through DG/RES interferes with 
the core business of a DSO, a risk-averse DSO is assumed in this case. 
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An approach that derives from this concept is a partial connection to the firm’s own cost, as expressed 
by the following formula (cf. [7]): 
( )
1
1
n
i i i i j j
j
P C f Cα α
=
= + − ∑  
The average price Pi is calculated by a weighted average of the own unit costs Ci and the other 
companies’ unit costs Cj, which are weighted with the factor fj. The weighted average can be shifted by 
adjusting the factor αi. This ensures that own costs will be taken into account and that the harshness of 
the original yardstick approach is absorbed partially. A practical difficulty in establishing such a 
yardstick regulation is how to determine peer groups of DSOs, i.e., how to account for structural 
differences between different monopoly’s regions. The Dutch regulator has implemented a yardstick 
regulation avoiding this problem: first, it assumes that all companies are efficient. Then, it does not 
regard absolute efficiencies, but their development: a DSO with higher efficiency gains is allowed to 
recover higher revenue than a DSO with lower efficiency gains [36]. 
Generally speaking, yardstick regulation puts a higher economic pressure on the regulated firms. For 
this reason, it is assumed that the focus will not be on DG/RES development in the DSO area, but on 
efficient operation of the current network. Even if additional expenses due to DG/RES are neutralized, 
the risk premium from the DSO’s point of view is estimated to be larger than for revenue or price cap 
incentive regulation. 
3.3.7 Tariff calculation schemes 
The previous section addresses the different regulation schemes for the calculation of a DSO’s total 
revenue or average price. This section deals with the question how this overall cap is distributed among 
single customer groups.  
According to Directive 2003/54/EC (Art. 20), the tariffs or methodologies for their calculation are 
approved ex-ante by national authorities. In all countries, customers are charged per capacity (kW) and 
actual energy transmission through the network (kWh). The underlying principle is that each customer 
should pay for his share of monopoly usage. However, differences which actors pay such charges 
prevail: consumers or consumers and generators are practiced approaches. 
The implementation of this Directive differs among EU member states: Germany has issued a 
regulation which describes the attribution of network costs to single customer groups in quite a detailed 
way (Strom-Netzentgeltverordnung). In other countries like the UK and Denmark, the DSOs have their 
own calculation schemes approved by the regulation authorities.  
The concept of classifying connection charges in the categories shallow, shallowish and deep is 
introduced in section 2.2.1. They correspond to DSO investment, which is depreciated over the 
expected lifetime of the asset. In the following, it is assumed that the income from connection charges 
is accounted for similarly. This avoids distortions in the size of the regulatory asset base, in other 
words: the DSO will not receive a return on bound capital if it is not its own bound capital. 
62 
For the sake of simplicity, the authors understand the regulatory system itself as stable –design changes 
with respect to DG/RES and changes in the force of regulatory control are nevertheless possible. Future 
income and expenses are discounted to present time t. Simplified income streams of a DSO are the 
following: the DSOs is modelled as having the purely economic interest of profit maximisation. DSOs 
with other objectives, e.g., cooperatives wishing to supply certain customer groups at minimal costs, 
are not covered. 
The profit π  is the difference between revenue R and expenditure E. 
t t tR Eπ = −  
 
OPEXCAPEXCECEE otherothersRESDGt −−−= /  
Expenditure is composed of connection expenditure CE, which is in this case separated into 
expenditure related to DG/RES and other. The remaining capital expenditure CAPEXother, e.g., for grid 
infrastructure replacements, and operating expenditure OPEX are subtracted. 
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The revenue is composed of connection charges CC and use of system charges UoS. Both are divided 
according to their conjunction with DG/RES. The DSO obtains connection charges in the same period 
as the investment takes place, whereas use of system charges due to today’s investments are recovered 
over the period T and therefore discounted with the interest rate r. The factor β represents a risk 
premium about the level of UoS charge recovery possibilities. It varies between the regulatory schemes 
and the impact of self-generation, as is explained below. 
 
There are two possible designs with respect to UoS charges and increasing self-generation. A DSO 
perceives self-generation as a threat to its core business and therefore a strategic issue. Nevertheless, it 
should in theory be indifferent if it can charge all investments with the remaining use of system 
charges. The alternative is that a decrease in system usage results in less UoS charges. From the DSO’s 
point of view, this is a risk that can vary with regulatory force. It is also included in the risk factor β, 
which is hence dependent on both the regulatory scheme and its enforcement. 
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4. Economic impacts of DG/RES integration on power markets 
This section deals with the economic impacts of DG/RES integration. Firstly, considerations on the 
efficiency of several support schemes are discussed. Secondly, the basic working principles of the spot 
market are described and possibilities for DG/RES integration are highlighted. The same order applies 
for the following subsection on regulating power markets; the underlying balancing principles and 
possible participation on other ancillary markets are addressed shortly. Finally, the consequences of 
DG/RES integration on allegations of market power in power markets are discussed. 
4.1 Efficiency of support schemes 
When promoting DG/RES installations, policy makers may have several goals in mind. Among these 
can be: 
• Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
• Independence from imported fuels, i.e., higher security of supply 
• Promotion of development of certain technologies 
• Establishment of new industries with additional employment. 
The instruments to reach such goals are chiefly measured by two criteria: effectiveness (e.g., if a 
certain RES penetration level has been met) and efficiency (what financial resources were necessary to 
reach an aim and what were the allocative implications?). These imply that a certain combination of 
DG/RES installed capacity or electricity production with a certain amount of expenses is aimed at. 
Efficiency can further be subdivided into static and dynamic efficiency: static efficiency focuses on a 
certain point in time, e.g., if a technological development is currently being supported with as little 
resources as possible to reach a desired level. Dynamic efficiency measures the technological 
development a support mechanism induces, i.e., if the costs of the energy decrease.  
The effectiveness and efficiency of a support schemes depends highly on the maturity of the 
technology [32]: investment grants are suitable for technologies that are far from maturity, whereas FIT 
and price premiums can support the dispersion of a technology when they are closer to being 
economically viable on the market. Quota obligations can be the most efficient instrument for 
technologies when these have reached a certain market penetration and can compete on the power 
market. The report stresses that not only the kind of support scheme, but also the way it is designed and 
the predictability of future changes are major aspects for DG/RES operators. FIT tariffs minimize 
transaction costs and can be efficient if the tariffs are stepped and decrease over time. Quota systems 
can reach the goal exactly and lead to “minimal total RES-E system costs”, but not necessarily to 
minimal costs for consumers [32]. Interactions between such DG/RES support schemes and other 
energy policy measures like CO2 quotas are the subject of ongoing scientific discussions and beyond 
the scope of this report [33]. 
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Peculiar combinations between grid connection and DG/RES support schemes are an indicator for 
suboptimal efficiency with respect to the focus of the IMPROGRES project. Unjustified high 
negotiated connection charges could render projects uneconomical which the policy makers intended to 
support sufficiently. A counterexample is voluntary grid connection expenses by a DG/RES operator in 
addition to shallow connection charges.  Such a case implies that the efficiency of the support scheme 
in combination with connection charges is not optimal, which is imminent to FIT and price premium 
schemes to a certain extent. A DG/RES investor could overcome organizational delays by voluntarily 
erecting a connection to a distant grid node. This way, the grid connection is ensured faster than 
waiting for the DSO to undertake similar measures. A similar case is reported from Germany, where a 
DG/RES unit erecting a connection grid is not bound by the same legal framework as a DSO. This led 
to a parallel DG/RES supply network without any final customer connections in a region [20]; the 
legitimacy of the DSO monopoly is challenged by a FIT support scheme at a level that allows the 
erection of a grid on top of DG/RES units. 
4.2 Spot market 
The national electricity spot markets offer a platform for wholesale trading. Their long-term 
counterpart is financial markets, which are mainly used for risk hedging. Spot markets facilitate actual 
power delivery and can be subdivided into several categories according to their time distance to 
delivery: day-ahead and intraday markets. The resulting market prices are also an indicator for the price 
level of bilateral electricity contracts (Over-the-Counter) due to arbitrage possibilities. 
Both buyers and suppliers can bid staggered bids expressing what amount of electricity they desire to 
buy or sell in a certain hour if the price exceeds or falls below a certain level12. They will not 
necessarily buy or sell for the price they bid, but for the market clearing price – that is the price of the 
marginal unit which still needs to produce to cover demand. The resulting prices depend therefore on 
the equilibrium of supply and demand. If demand is low, only supply units with low marginal costs are 
required to operate (base load). In times with high demand, peak load with higher marginal costs will 
determine the market clearing price13. This can be easily understood when looking at the stepped 
supply curve in Figure 5. 
The price effect of RES is also illustrated in this figure. Most RES are characterized by marginal 
operation costs of 0 Euro/MWh and will therefore always operate when meteorological conditions 
allow it. The same argumentation applies for CHP units which need to cover heat demand. In 
comparison to a case without RES, the necessary generation from conventional sources will be 
reduced. As the supply function is nonlinear, the price effects on the day-ahead spot market can be 
different: large RES generation in hours of rather low demand leads to a smaller price reduction than 
during hours with peak demand (see Figure 5). Following this argumentation, DG/RES can decrease 
spot market prices significantly: the unweighted average German spot market price was lowered by 
                                                 
12 Contrarily to most other European power exchanges, APX uses a half-hourly time resolution for the UK. 
13 The argumentation applies under perfect competition and without strategic behavior of market participants. 
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4.25 EUR/MWh in 2006 [37]14. This corresponds to a decline of 61 € for every MWh generated from 
RES, which is the bulk of the average FIT support level of 99.5 €/MWh for the respective year. 
Intraday spot markets are a means of correcting the day-ahead plans without having to use the 
regulating power market. Their age and maturity is different among the five focus countries. It can 
generally be assumed that a higher DG/RES penetration leads to a higher usage of these markets 
because market participants want to correct forecast errors without having to use the more expensive 
regulating markets. In a geographically small market, such forecast errors will show a high correlation 
among all units of a generation technology and have a uniform impact on market prices. A larger 
market can level this effect and financial expenditures and income from the intraday market can be 
more even for DG/RES units [24]. 
 
 
Figure 5: The effect of RES on spot market prices [37] 
The kind of participation of DG/RES in spot markets depends on the support scheme. Under a FIT 
system, the TSO or a regulator are obliged to buy all the electricity and integrate it into the power 
market by trading at the spot markets. It should be ensured that the other parts of a vertically not 
completely unbundled TSO do not profit from such an informational advantage. Under a price 
premium or quota system, DG/RES operators have to market their electricity. Special power exchange 
fees for clients with low trading volumes can support this integration. An alternative is that an agent 
bundles the generation of several DG/RES operators. This leads to higher specific transaction costs 
                                                 
14 An  underlying assumption is that the conventional power plant park is not adapted to increased generation from DG/RES 
[43]. 
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than for large central power plants; furthermore, participation in balancing procedures and regulatory 
markets is necessary.  
The major contribution to power prices from new additional capacity to power markets is of course a 
reduction of the price on the wholesale spot market. This also holds for adding new DG/RES capacity. 
As a major part of the investment costs of DG/RES are not recuperated on the spot market, but 
subsidised outside this market, the market will signal that no more capacity is needed by exhibiting 
lower prices. This distortion of price signals is only a distortion and a problem if we assume that DG 
investment has a lower capacity value than the investment that is not undertaken because it becomes 
unprofitable due to the reduced market prices.     
4.3 Regulating power markets 
The details and differentiations of regulating power are designed by national regulation and the national 
TSOs. For this reason, the following description of the regulating power market is an example how the 
market can be structured. The purpose of the regulating power market is the same everywhere: the 
correction of deviations from the schedule, i.e., the provision of additional electricity if frequency 
decreases, and reduction of electricity generation if the frequency increases. It depends on national 
market design when actors have the last possibility to correct their schedules on other markets – day-
ahead or as close as 15 minutes ahead. In general, it is assumed that variable supply sources as most 
DG/RES increase the demand for regulating power due to meteorological forecast errors. 
A first deviation from the nominal frequency of 50 Hz is corrected by primary regulated power. 
Primary frequency control has the aim of finding a new point of production and demand equilibrium to 
limit frequency deviations. This new equilibrium frequency is not (necessarily) equivalent to the 
frequency set point. In general, the responsible TSO has to ensure that the n-1 criterion is always met, 
which means that the largest generation unit in the grid can fail and be replaced immediately. For the 
UCTE synchronous area, the total primary regulating capacity is agreed to be at 3000 MW. Electricity 
producers can participate in a primary regulating power market, where their TSO ensures that his share 
of necessary capacity can be provided. Usually15, only the available capacity (MW) is traded and 
energy delivery (MWh) is neglected. Up- and down-regulation are not distinguished. The main market 
features are minimum bid sizes (MW) if these can be cover several generation units and the period 
length when the primary regulating capacity has to be available (e.g., 1 or 6 months). Main obstacles 
for DG/RES participation in this market are too high minimum bid sizes and long bidding periods 
because intermittent energy sources will not always be fully available. An organisational hindrance can 
occur if the bidder has to ensure permanent staff availability for the bidding period, which is also 
derogatory for distributed resources. 
Secondary regulating power replaces primary after a few minutes, if the deviation from the plan 
prevails.  The purpose of secondary control is the restoration of system frequency to its set point value 
                                                 
15 In some countries, such as The Netherlands, provision of primary reaction is obligatory for large generators and is without 
remuneration. 
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(50 Hz) and the power interchanges with adjacent control areas to their programmed scheduled values 
[34]. By doing so, the primary regulating capacity will be available again for sudden changes. 
Secondary regulating power is usually activated automatically by the responsible TSO. The offered 
capacity has to be fully available within 5 minutes. The market design differs from primary regulating 
power market’s design: bids are separated for positive and negative regulating power and power 
(MWh) can be remunerated along with capacity (MW). Secondary regulatory power is traded in shorter 
periods than primary regulating power, usually day-ahead. In some countries (e.g., the UK) every plant 
is remunerated as it has bid on the market (pay as bid). In other countries (e.g., the Netherlands) the 
highest offers and the lowest bids determine the upward and downward regulating prices that every 
provider will receive. In both ways, only the cheapest available regulating power will be activated. 
Most DG/RES have to be grouped to so-called virtual power plants to be able to participate in this 
market; however, transaction costs are for this reason expected to be higher than for large central power 
plants. 
Tertiary regulating power (or minute reserve) has to be fully available after 15 minutes and replaces 
secondary regulating power. The minute reserve will be used until the supply deviation is cleared, i.e., 
until the responsible actor could settle the difference on the intraday market. The market design is close 
to the secondary regulating power market: positive and negative capacities are distinguished as well as 
capacity and power payments. 
Regulating power is traditionally supplied by hydro storages and large condensing power plants and 
organized centrally by the respective TSO. There are better possibilities for DG/RES to participate in 
minute and secondary regulating power markets, as these are rather short-term based. In most cases, 
this requires grouping them to virtual power plants and controlling them with necessary communication 
infrastructure. Participation in primary regulating power markets is even under such conditions hardly 
achievable because the offered capacity has to be available during the whole period. 
4.4 Balancing mechanisms 
Balancing mechanisms are the financial counterpart of regulating power. Every market participant – 
mainly producers for the supply side and traders for the demand side – has to make sure that his net 
balance with the network is as it has been planned. If all participants comply with their plans, no 
deviation and thus no need for regulating power occurs16. However, if two actors cause a positive and a 
negative deviation, only the net deviation needs to be corrected on the regulating market. The balance 
group contributing to system stability (like regulating power) receives a payment because it is 
providing a service, the balance group causing the deviation has to pay for it. There are several 
accounting mechanisms used in practice to implement these basic principles (e.g. [19]), which can lead 
to different financial impacts on producers and consumers. The amount caused by DG/RES depends 
strongly on the design of these principles and on the balancing implementation of DG/RES: Grouping 
                                                 
16 This argumentation neglects possible short-term deviations between relevant moments of balance measurement. 
68 
various generation technologies from a large geographic area evens deviations of single units, whereas 
a low, regional aggregation of DG/RES units leads to a relatively larger balancing need.  
In case that parts of system responsibility are taken over by the DSO (“active DSO”, [16]), DG/RES 
integration into regulating markets could be fostered institutionally as well.  
4.5 Market power 
Vertically integrated electricity monopolies have been replaced by competitive markets during the last 
20 years. As natural monopoly characteristics prevail for the transmission and distribution systems, 
competition has only been introduced to generation, gross and retail electricity trade. Competition can 
also be introduced to markets which are traditionally part of network operations, e.g., metering 
services. This section focuses on gross electricity markets, where deviations from perfect competition 
prices and therewith the existence of market power has been alleged in various countries (for an 
overview, see e.g. [22]). 
The possibility of exercising market power derives from a large market share. In such a case, a market 
actor can tend to behave like a monopolist, i.e., influence the market in a way that results will differ 
from fully competitive outcomes. Long-term financial power trading is a means of risk hedging of 
various market actors; the focus of the following paragraph is on the day-ahead spot market. 
A common design feature of most European power exchanges is a common clearing price, i.e., that all 
bidders awarded with a contract receive the same hourly price, regardless of their actual bid. For the 
sake of simplicity, in the following argumentation generators are considered only and demand is 
assumed to be an exogenous function (see Figure 6). Single power plants are expected to be bid with 
their marginal cost, i.e., approximately 0 €/MWh for most RES, low levels for lignite and nuclear 
power and higher demand being covered by coal, combined cycle gas turbines and single cycle gas 
turbines. If demand is low (typically at night), base load power plant production will suffice for 
covering demand. During peak times, the plants with higher marginal costs will determine the clearing 
price at the exchange. Under perfect competition, these marginal costs are short run marginal costs 
(SRMC) and not the long-run marginal costs (LRMC), which contribute to amortise the generation 
unit. Base load power plants can recover their investment costs when the market clearing price is set by 
units with higher SRMC; the units with highest SRMC can only recover their investment cost through 
price spikes, i.e. when demand is equal to or higher than supply [22]. For this reason, there is an 
incentive for large market actors with several generation units to withdraw capacity, as Figure 6 
illustrates: by withholding a power plant from the market, a generator will suffer a loss (difference 
between market clearing price and his marginal cost), but can obtain a much higher benefit because the 
remaining generation units will obtain a higher price. This, of course, implies that this generator needs 
a considerable market share. 
The exercise of market power cannot be derived directly from a high market share and price spikes or a 
price level higher than SRMC can be due to a general capacity shortage. It is therefore hard to prove 
market power statistically and conclusions about market power in single spot markets can diverge 
considerably (see e.g. [22] and [30], for Germany or [23] and [41], for Scandinavia). However, it seems 
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that concerns about market power decrease strongly when the capacity bid into the market is divided 
between as many actors as possible. If DG/RES capacities are not marketed through the trading 
divisions of large vertically integrated companies, they can help to disperse allegations of market 
power. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example for possibility of market power exercise 
Source: [30], cited after [31]; own translation 
Regulating power markets are nowadays characterised by a single buyer and large power plant 
operators, which have a considerable market shares in some countries. In Germany, the regulator 
concludes that these were “sharing the market peacefully” for a partial market [2]. The participation of 
DG/RES could therefore be positive to overcome assertions of non-competitive markets. 
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5. Final remarks 
This report addresses various aspects of integrating distributed and renewable energy generation into 
DSO networks. Considering current EU energy policy goals in general and specific policy targets in 
particular, it is expected that there is a continuing need to integrate increasing amounts of this type of 
generation technologies in current electricity systems. 
The detailed effects of a certain mode of DG/RES integration and market participation depends on a 
multitude of factors, e.g., penetration levels, existing network constraints, and the design of ancillary 
service markets. In general, it is possible to conclude that a sufficiently high DG/RES remuneration 
level (for example through support schemes) can ensure a fast penetration growth of the respective 
technologies and also help overcome obstacles such as high connection charges. However, DSOs 
should receive incentives to pursue a more active network management approach and to plan network 
expansion taking possible DG generation into account. As universally valid conclusions for DG/RES 
and DSO interactions are difficult to derive, the following reports of the IMPROGRES project will 
analyse several case studies. 
 
For the provision of incentives to invest in optimal generation locations, DG/RES support should be 
generation based. To make DG operate in the most flexible mode, the support should be market based 
whenever possible. The higher risk perception is not seen as a major argument against market 
integration. Allowing DG to operate on both day ahead and regulating markets requires that DG 
generators are exposed to balancing costs themselves. If they operate on two markets simultaneously, 
they will be able to generate higher revenues, implying that possibly less governmental support is 
needed without obstructing further penetration of DG/RES technologies. 
For the optimal location of DG in different DSO grids, it is assumed that there are positive network 
effects (cost reductions) from DG, at least when penetration rates are low to moderate. These cost 
reductions, for example from reduced network losses, must be allowed to contribute to the DSOs’ 
profits. Network regulation must not undermine this cost reduction by depriving the DSO of these 
benefits. By the same token, the DSO should pass a share of this cost reduction to the DG generator by 
premiums or reduced connection charges for DG investment at favourable network locations or up to 
favourable levels (aggregate network loss reductions) of DG penetration in their grid.  
 
With respect to curtailment of DG/RES production due to insufficient network capacity or faults, 
obliging the DSO to compensate lost revenue of the DG/RES operator gives the DSO an incentive to 
invest in network reinforcements. Full compensation in the case of fixed FIT will give too high an 
incentive to invest relative to the low market value at the time of curtailment. The market based support 
system will imply lower compensation payments and therefore lower network reinforcements, which is 
in line with the lower value of power at these times as shown by the market price. Too high 
compensation payments will lead to overinvestment in grid reinforcement. Some cost of curtailed 
power to the DG is beneficial to the optimal location decision. If the DG generator is always 
compensated fully there is no incentive to invest instead in a grid where curtailment will not take place.  
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